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ABSTRACT
This paper is a draft of Chapter 8 of a planned book, Preschool and Jobs: Human Development as
Economic Development, and Vice Versa. This book analyzes early childhood programs’ effects on
regional economic development. Four early childhood programs are considered: 1) universally accessible
preschool for four-year-olds of similar quality to the Chicago Child Parent Center program; 2) the
Abecedarian program, which provides disadvantaged children with high-quality child care and preschool
from infancy to age five; 3) the Nurse Family Partnership, which provides low-income first-time mothers
with nurse home visitors from the prenatal period until the child is age two; and 4) the Parent Child-Home
program, which provides home visits and educational toys and books to disadvantaged families when the
child is between the ages of 2 and 3.
The book considers the main benefit of state economic development to be the resulting increase
in earnings of the original residents who stay in that state. Early childhood programs increase residents’
earnings largely by increasing the quantity and quality of local labor supply. These programs will increase
the employability and wages of former child participants in these programs. The book compares the
effects on local earnings of early childhood programs with the effects of business incentives (e.g.,
property tax abatements). Business incentives increase local residents’ earnings by increasing the quantity
and/or quality of local labor demand.
This chapter considers the effects of early childhood programs and business incentives on the
income distribution. A key issue is whether early childhood programs should be targeted on the poor, or
made universally available for free. Relevant considerations in addressing this issue include how benefits
of early childhood programs benefit with family income, and the political feasibility of targeted versus
universal programs.
JEL Classification Codes: J13, J24, I21, R23, R31, R30
I thank Wei-Jang Huang, Claire Black, and Linda Richer for assistance with this book. I also
thank the Pew Charitable Trusts for financial assistance for some of the research that led to this book. The
findings and opinions of this book are those of the author, and should not be construed as reflecting
official views of Pew or the Upjohn Institute.

How do early childhood programs affect the poor versus the middle class versus the rich? The
answer to this question is important for several reasons.
First, effects on different income groups may change these programs’ social benefits. In this
discussion, I assume, without providing extensive justification, that programs that tilt benefits toward the
poor are more socially desirable. Policymakers, policy analysts, and voters may favor such a tilt because
of special concern for alleviating the problems of the poor. Alternatively, policymakers, policy analysts
and voters may be concerned with making the income distribution more equal. A more equal income
distribution may increase the number of people who can meet social standards for being a respectable
member of society. Concern over the income distribution may be greater at present because over the last
30 years the U.S. income distribution has become more unequal. To address concerns about the poor, we
need information on whether early childhood programs significantly affect the incomes of the poor. To
address concerns about the income distribution, we need information about how the effects on the poor
compare with effects on other income groups.1
Second, how early childhood programs affect various income groups may influence which
income groups will provide these programs with political support. An income group is less likely to
support a program as the program’s taxes increase relative to the program’s benefits. Assessing patterns
of political support requires comparing the program’s benefits with taxes for different income groups.
Adopting and sustaining a program requires political support that is sufficiently powerful.
Third, how a program affects different income groups may influence program design. For early
childhood programs, one important design issue is whether these programs should be targeted at children
in lower income groups, or whether services should be universally available to all children. This is most
prominently an issue for preschool programs. The targeting versus universal service debate is advanced
by looking at specific numbers for how programs benefit different income groups under different designs.
To frame this chapter’s discussion, I begin with arguments for targeting preschool services on the
poor versus universalizing preschool. I then consider the effects on different income groups of business
1

incentives. The effects of business incentives provide a baseline for considering the income distribution
effects of early childhood programs. I then go on to provide estimates of the income distribution effects
of preschool programs under various assumptions about program design and program effects. Finally, I
consider the income distribution effects of other early childhood programs.

TARGETING PRESCHOOL VERSUS UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL
Advocates for targeting preschool argue that policymakers should invest where returns are
greatest. Targeting advocates perceive returns as being greatest for children from lower-income families.
Nobel Prize–winning economist James Heckman makes the following argument:
…I think the evidence is very strong that family background is a major predictor of future behavior of
children. So a disproportionate number of problem kids come from disadvantaged families. The simple
economics of intervention therefore suggests that society should focus its investment where it’s likely to
have very high returns. Right now, that is the disadvantaged population....Functioning middle-class
homes are producing healthy, productive kids … It is foolish to try to substitute for what the middle-class
and upper-class parents are already doing. (Heckman 2005)

Advocates for universal services make two arguments. The first is that even if preschool’s
benefits are greater for the poor, preschool may still have benefits for middle-class children that exceed its
costs. Steven Barnett, co-director of the National Institute for Early Education Research, argues that:
If the development of children in higher-income families is taken as an indicator of what is optimal, then
it is clear that not only children in poverty, but children at the median income are entering school far less
prepared to succeed than they should be. Children at the median income are as far behind their peers from
families in the top income quintile as children in poverty are behind their peers from middle-income
families. (Barnett 2006)

Barnett admits that
The weight of the evidence seems to indicate that effects [of preschool] are somewhat smaller for
children who are not economically disadvantaged. However, these effects are not trivial and are
proportionately large enough that long-term economic benefits [of preschool] for middle-income children
could easily exceed costs. (Barnett 2006)
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The second argument is that universal programs are more politically feasible and sustainable than
programs targeted on the poor. This argument has been made with great force by Harvard sociologist
Theda Skocpol:
Rarely … do advocates of targeted benefits or specially tailored public support services face up to the
problem of finding sustained political support for them … [I]t seems highly unlikely that further
redistributive benefits or intensive services targeted on the poor alone can succeed politically. We still
live amidst the backlash against the War on Poverty and the Great Society … Instead of policies for the
disadvantaged alone, targeting within universalism is the prescription for effective and politically
sustainable policies to fight poverty in the United States … When U.S. antipoverty efforts have featured
policies targeted on the poor alone, they have not been politically sustainable, and they have stigmatized
and demeaned the poor. (Skocpol 1991)

By “targeting within universalism,” Skocpol means policies that provide disadvantaged groups with extra
services within a program with universally accessibility.
Targeted programs may lack the political support needed to be enacted or sustained. Even if the
programs can be sustained, lack of political support may mean there is inadequate funding or political
attention to maintain program quality. Steven Barnett restates the often used phrase: “The truth is that
programs for the poor are too often poor programs.” Barnett argues that preschool programs targeted at
the poor too often do not follow the best program designs:
The targeted programs provided to low-income children have never been closely modeled on those that
produced the largest benefits. Preschool teachers in many targeted programs are required to have only a
high school diploma. Even Head Start requires only half of its teachers to have a two-year college degree.
Many state-funded preschool programs do not require college degrees. Looking at subsidized child care
policy at both federal and state levels, there is little evidence of a commitment to anything more than
warehousing young children. Preschool teachers are paid about half what public school teachers earn, and
child care staff are even more poorly paid. (Barnett 2006)

The counter argument is that universal programs are much more expensive. Providing expensive
services to the affluent may be politically controversial. Heckman outlines the following argument that
might be made against universal preschool education:
Unfortunately, in discussions of early childhood interventions, people often bundle political issues with
economic issues. Part of the appeal of universal early childhood intervention is that it provides universal
day care, so some groups favor universal early childhood education because it effectively subsidizes
women’s working. But bundling in this way also creates an opposition group saying, “Why should we
subsidize affluent working women?” (Heckman 2005)
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Robert Greenstein of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities argues that the right kind of
targeted programs for the poor can get political support. In contrast, universal programs may oftentimes
run into problems because of large costs. According to Greenstein:
The evidence … indicates that factors other whether a program is universal or targeted have a significant
bearing on the political prospects of social programs. Targeted programs, for example, are more likely to
be strong politically when they serve low-income and moderate-income working families as well as the
very poor. They are also more likely to succeed when they are regarded as providing an earned benefit or
are otherwise linked to work, when they are entitlement programs with federal prescribed and funded
benefits, when they seem effective, and when they are not provided in the form of cash welfare assistance
for young, able-bodied people who do not work.
Skocpol’s principal conclusion, that those seeking to develop new anti-poverty policies should rely
almost exclusively on universal approaches, seems weak on another account as well: it conflicts with
current fiscal constraints. Advocates of new universal programs need to acknowledge the political
difficulties posed by the large costs of such programs, just as advocates of targeted programs need to
acknowledge the political problems inherent in spending tax dollars on a narrow segment of the
population. (Greenstein 1991)

Whether targeted versus universal programs are the best way to deal with poverty is a fascinating
philosophical debate. However, numbers can provide greater content to the argument. I now provide some
actual numbers for the income distribution effects of different programs. I begin with business incentives
before going on to various designs of universal preschool and other early childhood programs.

BUSINESS INCENTIVES: WHO BENEFITS
I begin by analyzing the income distribution effects of business incentives. This analysis serves as
a baseline for analyzing the income distribution effects of early childhood programs. The analysis also
introduces the concepts that will be used to analyze income distribution effects.
Unlike the early childhood programs, business incentive programs as I have defined them have no
natural scale. My models assume that business incentive programs have similar ratios of earnings effects
to costs at different scales. In the simulations, I scale this permanent business incentive so that its cost, in
present value terms, is the same as the modeled universal preschool program. As it happens, such a scale
is roughly similar to what state and local governments typically spend on financial incentives to business
4

(as opposed to specialized business services).2 Therefore, the effects reported can be interpreted as the
likely effects of a typical state’s financial incentives for business.
To analyze distributional effects, I consider the effects on different quintiles of the household
income distribution (Table 8.1). Quintiles are defined by ranking all households in the United States by
household income. This ranking is then divided into five quintiles.
The quintiles differ widely in their share of overall household income (row 1 of Table 8.1).3 If
each household in the United States had the same income, then each quintile would have 20 percent of
total U.S. income. Instead, the lowest income quintile has only 3.4 percent of total household income,
which implies that the average household income of this quintile is about one-sixth of average household
income for all U.S. households. In contrast, the highest income quintile has 49.7 percent of total
household income. This implies that the average household income of this quintile is about two-and-ahalf times the average household income for all U.S. households.
The simulations in this chapter report effects of a particular program on the present value of
household earnings, or the present value of taxes. These figures are sometimes calculated as a percentage
of the total present value of income for each household income quintile. This analysis thereby includes
both immediate and long-term effects of each program on household income. All effects are included by
discounting all future earnings, tax, and income flows at a 3 percent real discount rate.4
For each quintile, I calculated the estimated dollar effects of business incentives on the present
value of household earnings, relative to the average dollar effects for the lowest income quintile. These
figures are derived by estimates I obtained in Bartik (1994) based on estimates of how metropolitan
income distributions were affected by increases in employment growth.5
The dollar effect of business incentives on earnings tends to be lower for lower income quintiles,
and higher for higher income quintiles (row 2 of Table 8.1). For example, the dollar effects of business
incentives on the present value of earnings for the middle income quintile are a little more than twice the
dollar effect on the lowest income quintile. The dollar effect on the highest income quintile is about three
5

times the dollar effect on the lowest income quintile. Why is this the case? Business incentives increase
earnings by increasing demand for labor. How much a given income group can respond to this labor
demand increase is influenced by its involvement with the labor market and its skill level. Lower income
groups have a lower percentage of their income in earnings. Furthermore, they earn lower hourly wages,
so a given increase in hours of work has smaller dollar effects. Therefore, an increase in labor demand
increases earnings by less in dollar terms for lower income groups.
However, as a percentage of income, the effect of business incentives on earnings is much greater
for lower income quintiles (row 3 of Table 8.1). For example, the percentage effect of incentives on
earnings for the lowest income quintile are about twice those of the middle income quintile. The
percentage effect on earnings for the lowest income quintile is almost five times those for the highest
income quintile. Even more modest dollar effects on earnings amount to larger percentage effects on
income. One way to put it is that because lower income quintiles have more hours per year of
unemployment and nonparticipation in the labor force, there is more room for greater percentage effects
on their incomes.
The earnings effects as a percentage of income of this business incentive program must be
compared to the program’s effects on taxes of each income group. From the previous analysis in Chapter
3, we have estimates of the costs of a business incentive program relative to its effects on earnings. We
need to determine how to allocate these costs across different income quintiles. I use estimates from the
Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy on the relative percentage burden of state and local taxes
across income quintiles (McIntyre et al. 2003; Table 8.1, row 4).6
These estimates are consistent with the consensus among public finance economists that state and
local tax burdens are distributed in a modestly regressive fashion. That is, state and local tax burdens tend
to be a somewhat higher percentage of income for lower income quintiles.
From these estimates of percentage earnings benefits by quintile, and percentage tax costs by
quintile, I construct two statistics to describe income distribution effects. These same two statistics will be
6

constructed for early childhood programs as well. First, I calculate the simple difference of percentage of
income earnings benefits minus percentage of income tax costs. This is the net percentage effect on the
present value of income of each income quintile due to the program. Second, I calculate the ratio of the
present value of earnings effects of the program to the present value of its tax costs. This is the ratio for
each quintile of what it pays for the program to what it gets—a type of benefit-cost ratio.
Both these statistics might play a role in whether a given income quintile would support a
program. The first statistic gives a “bottom line” for each program in terms of net effects on income. The
second statistic reveals whether the program returns much in effects compared to what each income
quintile invests in the program.
For business incentives, the net percentage effects on each income quintile are positive (Table
8.1, row 5). Furthermore, the ratio of net earnings benefits to net costs is considerably greater than one
for each quintile (Table 8.1, row 6). Overall, each income quintile has good economic reasons to favor a
high-quality business incentive program.
Why do business incentives benefit all income quintiles? First, as discussed in detail in Chapters
3 and 5, the high-quality business incentive program I model has overall benefits that substantially exceed
costs, by a factor of over three to one. Second, as outlined above, the benefits of stronger local economic
growth tend to be spread quite broadly. Higher income quintiles actually gain more in dollar terms from
local economic growth, even though they gain less in percentage terms. At the same time, the regressivity
of the tax burden from these programs is insufficient to offset the progressive effect that local economic
growth has in increasing the incomes of lower income quintiles by a greater percentage.
The income distribution effects of business incentive programs are modestly progressive.7 Net
percentage effects of the program on the lowest income quintile are slightly over double those on the
middle income quintile. Net percentage effects on the middle income quintile are about 4 times those on
the highest income quintile. In terms of ratios, the ratio of earnings effects to costs is about 70 percent
greater for the lowest income quintile than for the middle income quintile. The ratio of earnings benefits
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to costs is about twice as great for the middle income quintile compared to the highest income quintile.
However, the bottom line is that the net percentage effects of business incentives on the lowest
income quintile are quite modest. The estimates suggest that a typical state’s financial business incentives
only raise the income of the lowest income quintile by about one-and-a-half percent. These programs are
not going to dramatically raise the well-being of the poor.
The reasons for these modest effects are that the progressive income distribution effects and antipoverty effects of business incentives are limited by the problems that the lowest income groups have in
the labor market. Expanding overall labor demand only addresses one of the problems that low income
groups have in the labor markets. Given the more limited involvement of lower income groups in the
labor market, and given their lower wages, there are limits to how much expanded overall labor demand
can do to help the poor.
More progressive distributional effects might be achieved by business incentives that targeted
more of the labor demand increases on lower income groups. For example, this might occur due to
business incentive programs that successfully get assisted businesses to focus a greater share of their
hiring on the local unemployed. As discussed in Chapter 5, greater hiring of the local unemployed can be
encouraged through First-Source programs coupled with customized job training. Business incentives
may also be provided for hiring the local unemployed, such as in Minnesota’s MEED program.
Business incentives could be made more progressive. However, the progressivity of boosts to
labor demand are limited by how much such programs can change the job skills of the disadvantaged.
Customized job training programs can increase job skills. Getting more job experience through greater
labor demand can increase job skills. However, there is common sense to the notion that larger changes in
skills may require human capital programs that directly focus on skills development. Adding on human
capital components to business incentives may have more limited effects on job skills.
Greater help for the labor market problems of the poor requires greater changes in their skills.
This is probably most appropriately addressed through human capital programs. Early childhood
8

programs are human capital programs that try to intervene early, when skills are thought to be the most
malleable.
Preschool: Speculation About Possible Distributional Benefits
The challenge in assessing the distributional effects of preschool is that there is no direct
evidence. The best studies, such as those of Perry Preschool and the Chicago Child Parent Centers, focus
on long-run effects on children from disadvantaged families. No studies rigorously examine long-run
effects of high-quality preschool on children from middle-class and upper-class families. For example,
although Heckman believes the returns from preschool is lower for middle-class families than the poor, he
admits that this belief is not proven by empirical evidence: “Now you say, Do I have really hard evidence
on this? The answer is no” (Heckman 2005).
We can speculate about possible patterns of preschool effects across different income groups. On
the one hand, children in more disadvantaged groups are further from “optimal patterns” of child
development. This might make it easier to improve the development path for these children. On the other
hand, as Barnett argues, middle-class children also lag behind children from upper-class families. He
maintains that there might be considerable benefits for middle class children.
With respect to later outcomes, children from disadvantaged families will have greater baseline
high school dropout rates. Therefore, it might be easier to improve high school graduation rates for
disadvantaged groups. On the other hand, children from more advantaged groups might be closer to
attaining a college degree. It might be easier for preschool to positively affect college graduation rates for
advantaged groups.
In this context, it is relevant that the dollar return from attaining a college degree is greater than
the dollar return from attaining a high school degree. The annual earnings boost from attaining a four-year
college degree, versus only a high school degree, is $19,400 (2005 dollars), increasing annual earnings
from $31,500 to $50,900. The annual earnings boost from attaining a high school degree but no higher
degree, versus being a high school dropout, is $8,100, increasing earnings from $23,400 to $31,500.
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(Baum and Ma 2007). A much smaller increase in college degree attainment is needed to provide the
same earnings increase as an increase in high school degree attainment.
Another way to describe the contending influences is as follows. Disadvantaged groups have
lower baseline wages and employment rates than more advantaged groups. On the one hand, this provides
more potential for increasing earnings through boosting wages and employment rates. On the other hand,
a given boost in employment rates or wage rates will increase earnings by more in dollar terms for groups
with higher baseline rates.
The best direct evidence on distributional effects of universal preschool is from studies of
Oklahoma’s universal preschool program (Gormley et al. 2005). This evidence is only for short-run
effects. The Gormley et al. study compares test score results for children who are just below or just above
the age cutoff for Oklahoma’s preschool program. The treatment group is children who barely made the
age cutoff for attending preschool the previous year, who actually did attend the state preschool program,
and who are now beginning kindergarten. The comparison group is children who barely missed the age
cutoff for attending preschool the previous year, and who are now beginning the state preschool program.
Both groups are administered the same test at the same time. The groups are similar in age and other
characteristics. The groups differ mainly in that the treatment group attended the state’s preschool the
previous year, while the comparison group did not attend the state’s preschool program. However, the
comparison group may have attended private preschool programs. Gormley et al. find that although test
score results improve with age, there is an abrupt jump in test score results at the age cutoff. This abrupt
jump is most likely associated with having attended the state’s preschool program.8
Gormley and his colleagues find evidence that preschool has short-run positive effects on test
scores for children from all income groups. As is common in educational research, the only information
on income status of children is whether they are eligible for a free lunch under federal rules (family
income less than 130 percent of the poverty line) or a reduced-price lunch (family income between 130
percent and 185 percent of the poverty line), or whether they must pay full price for lunch (family income
10

above 185 percent of the poverty line). Test score effects for the highest income group are quite similar to
test score effects for the lowest income group. Test score effects for the middle income group are
somewhat higher than test score effects for either the higher income or lower income groups.9
Gormley et al.’s results weaken the case that preschool will have smaller effects on more
advantaged children. Preschool is about as effective in increasing the test scores of higher income groups
as it is for lower income groups.

BASELINE RESULTS FOR DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL
For the baseline results, I use distributional assumptions from Karoly and Bigelow (2005). Their
results assume that lower-income children are more likely to enroll in universal preschool than upperincome children. In addition, lower-income children are assumed to be less likely than upper-income
children to be enrolled in high-quality preschool in the absence of a high-quality universal program.
Finally, for any particular change in preschool enrollment brought about by universal preschool, the dollar
benefits are assumed to be more for lower-income children than upper-income children. For example,
consider children who without universal preschool would not have been in any preschool program.
Karoly and Bigelow assume that in this group of children, benefits for upper-income children are onefourth the benefits for lower-income children.10
I simulate the distributional effects of universal preschool under these assumptions (Table 8.2).
One part of the simulation calculates the dollar effect of preschool on the average participant in each
income quintile relative to the lowest income quintile (row 2, Table 8.2). These dollar effects are based on
Karoly and Bigelow’s assumptions. (Appendix 8A details how these effects are derived from Karoly and
Bigelow’s assumptions.) These distributional effects across quintiles assume a quite rapid fall-off in
dollar effects from the lowest income quintiles to middle income and higher income quintiles. For
example, the dollar effects on the middle income quintile are less than a third of the dollar effects on the
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lowest income quintile. Dollar effects on the two highest income quintiles are less than one-tenth of the
dollar effects on the lowest income quintile.11
This fall-off in distributional effects is qualitatively consistent with the opinions of other
preschool experts. Karoly and Bigelow’s assumptions imply a somewhat larger quantitative fall-off in per
child benefits with family income than is assumed by some other researchers. For example, Steve Barnett,
the co-director of the National Institute for Early Education Research, assumed that effects for children in
the middle three quintiles would be one-half those of children in the lowest income quintile, while effects
for the top quintile would be zero (Barnett 2004). He regards these as “realistic assumptions about
program participation and extrapolated benefits.” Heckman has not made specific assumptions about how
preschool’s returns decline for higher-income children. However, his remarks imply that returns are
smaller for middle- and upper-income children, not nonexistent.
Under these distributional assumptions, universal preschool’s benefits are distributed highly
progressively. The return per dollar of tax cost is about 25 to 1 for the lowest income quintile (row 6,
Table 8.2). This is almost nine times the return per dollar of tax cost for the middle income quintile.
Furthermore, the return per dollar of tax cost is about nine times as great for the middle income quintile as
it is for the highest income quintile.12
Preschool provides large benefits for the lowest income quintile. The net present value of
earnings benefits, even allowing for the regressive nature of state and local taxes, are almost 7 percent of
income for the lowest income quintile.13 This large effect is not surprising. The estimates for the lowest
income quintile are based on studies of the Chicago Child Parent Center program. This program gained
fame because it was so effective.14
On the other hand, under these distributional assumptions, preschool’s benefits are distributed
quite broadly. There are net positive benefits for the bottom three income quintiles, and thus net positive
benefits for over half the population. The net benefits for the middle income quintile are a little less than
one-half of 1 percent of income. Even the two upper income quintiles get some nonnegligible benefits.
12

The highest income quintile gets 32 cents in benefits for every dollar invested. The next highest income
quintile gets 59 cents in benefits for every dollar invested. These benefits occur partially due to the broad
labor demand benefits of simply spending more money. But they also occur because preschool’s benefits
are so large for the disadvantaged, that even benefits for upper income quintiles that are drastically scaled
back have some importance.
But universal preschool’s benefits are more progressive, and hence less broad, compared to
business incentives. For example, consider a universal preschool program and a business incentives
program of the same cost. For the lowest income quintile, the net benefits of the preschool program are
almost five times the net benefits of the business incentive program (Table 8.2, row 5 vs. row 7). Yet the
business incentive program overall has higher net benefits and returns. The upper three quintiles clearly
gain much more from business incentives than from universal preschool.
Universal preschool’s benefits are more progressive compared to business incentives because of
how dollar benefits vary across income quintiles. As discussed above, the research literature suggests that
increases in labor demand yield considerably higher dollar benefits on higher income quintiles. On the
other hand, everyone seems to agree that dollar benefits of universal preschool are highest in the lowest
income quintile.

ADDING IN POSSIBLE CAPITALIZATION EFFECTS
As discussed in Chapter 7, universal preschool programs may lead to some property value
increases. Property buyers and sellers may recognize the benefits of preschool in increasing the earnings
of former child participants and their parents. If they do so, property value increases will “capitalize”
some of the benefits of universal preschool. Benefits will be transferred from workers to property owners.
This capitalization is likely to make the returns to preschool more regressive.
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The extent of capitalization depends upon whether property buyers and sellers recognize the
future earnings benefits of preschool. Capitalization also depends upon what discount rates are used by
property buyers and sellers to value these future earnings benefits. I will assume here the maximum
possible capitalization that has some empirical support, as discussed in Chapter 7. Specifically, I will
assume that property buyers and sellers take full account of future earnings effects. I assume the taxes
associated with these programs are ignored by property buyers and sellers. I assume property buyers and
sellers use a real discount rate of 4.7 percent in considering how the earnings benefits from universal
preschool should affect property valuations. These assumptions yield a relatively large amount of
capitalization. Other plausible assumptions about how property buyers and sellers behave would yield
lower degrees of capitalization. Based on these assumptions, I calculate that universal preschool will
increase property values by 6.4 percent. How this particular property value increase is derived is
discussed in Chapter 7.
I simulate the distributional effects of universal preschool under this capitalization assumption
(Table 8.3). A considerable percentage of the total earnings benefits of preschool are capitalized into
higher values. I estimate that preschool leads to property value increases that are about half the present
value of earnings benefits.15
Furthermore, the costs and benefits of this capitalization are distributed in a manner that makes
distributional effects less progressive. For example, the lowest income quintile has a much higher
percentage loss (about four times as great) from higher consumer housing prices than is true for the
highest income quintile (0.753 percent vs. 0.196 percent; row 3 of Table 8.3). But the highest income
quintile has a somewhat higher percentage gain from higher property values than the lowest income
quintile (0.289 percent vs. 0.239 percent, about 20 percent greater; row 4 of Table 8.3).
Higher consumer housing prices have larger costs for lower income quintiles because housing
expenditures are a greater percentage of income for lower income quintiles. Higher property values
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provide greater benefits for the highest income quintile because the highest income quintile owns more
property relative to its income.
Therefore, on net, capitalization makes the distribution of the benefits from universal preschool
less progressive. The lower income quintiles gain less, and the highest income quintile gains more.
However, the earnings benefits from universal preschool are so great for the lower income
quintiles that their net benefits from universal preschool are still quite high. For example, for the lowest
income quintile, capitalization only lowers the ratio of net after tax benefits to costs from about 25 to
about 23. (Compare rows 8 and 10 in Table 8.3.) This is still a very progressive program.
Capitalization does significantly increase the payoff from universal preschool to the highest
income quintile. The highest income quintile now receives 78¢ in benefits for every tax dollar invested.
This is over double the 32¢ if there is no capitalization (Row 8 and row 10, Table 8.3).
It is apparent from these calculations that even complete capitalization would not eliminate the overall
progressivity of universal preschool. Even if the overall benefits of preschool are fully capitalized into
higher property values, this does not mean that these benefits are completely capitalized for each income
group. We can think of blowing up capitalization benefits so they were the same as the overall earnings
benefits. Under this assumption, the lowest income quintile still gains so much from the higher earnings
benefits that the capitalization effects cannot completely offset these effects. Because all income groups
participate in the same housing market, capitalization effects can not perfectly offset earnings benefits for
each income group, even if they do so overall.16

ALTERNATIVE DISTRIBUTIONAL ASSUMPTIONS
The baseline distributional assumptions for universal preschool seem reasonable. As Karoly and
Bigelow said, these distributional assumptions “can arguably be viewed as quite conservative.” Given
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current evidence, the most reasonable assumption is that preschool benefits significantly decline as we go
from disadvantaged families to middle income families, but not to zero.
However, because of the lack of evidence on long-term distributional effects of universal
preschool, it seems prudent to consider alternative distributional assumptions. I consider two sets of
alternative assumptions. One set is that the dollar benefits for the children of all income groups are the
same as the dollar benefits for the disadvantaged. This set of assumptions broadens benefits. Given that
everyone seems to agree that dollar benefits actually decline with increasing family income, this set of
assumptions captures one bound that contains the possible assumptions. The other set of assumptions
assumes that benefits are zero for the children of non-disadvantaged income groups. Given that there
should be some benefits of preschool for middle-class children, this second set of assumptions captures
another bound that contains the possible assumptions.
I did simulations that compared the distributional effects of universal preschool under three sets
of assumptions: the baseline assumptions, and these two sets of extreme bound assumptions (Table 8.4). I
focused on comparing three types of effects for each income quintile: 1) the dollar benefits of preschool
relative to the lowest income group, 2) the present value of the net after-tax benefits of universal
preschool as a percentage of income, and 3) the ratio of the present value of earnings benefits to the
present value of tax costs.
Despite the extremity of the assumptions, the results have some elements in common. First, under
all these assumptions, overall net benefits are positive. Second, under all these assumptions, the
distribution of the benefits of universal preschool are highly progressive.
Overall net benefits are positive in all three cases because the benefits of universal preschool for
the disadvantaged group alone are greater than the overall costs of universal preschool. Extra benefits for
non-disadvantaged groups are icing on the cake. Furthermore, benefits are always distributed
progressively because the most regressive assumption is that different income groups have the same
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dollar benefit from preschool. Even with this extreme assumption of equal dollar benefits, the percentage
benefits from preschool will be much greater for lower income quintiles.
Of course, there also are some large differences in results. As one would expect, universal
preschool’s overall benefits are much greater when we assume that preschool’s large dollar benefits for
the disadvantaged broadly extend to all income groups. Overall net benefits more than triple. (Overall net
benefits increase from 0.396 percent of income under the baseline assumptions to 1.370 percent under the
equal dollar benefits for all groups assumptions. See rows 3 and 6, Table 8.4). This broadening of
benefits means that all income groups have net benefits from universal preschool, not just the first three
quintiles (row 3 and row 6). In contrast, universal preschool’s benefits are much lower when benefits are
restricted to the disadvantaged. Overall net benefits of universal preschool are cut in half when only the
disadvantaged benefit. (Overall net benefits decrease from 0.396 percent under the baseline assumptions
to 0.203 percent. See rows 3 and 9, Table 8.4.) The program redistributes income from the upper three
quintiles to the bottom two quintiles. If only the disadvantaged get earnings benefits from the program,
the upper three quintiles all lose about one-fifth of 1 percent in income from the increased taxes to pay for
the universal preschool program (row 9, Table 8.4).

TARGETED VS. UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL
Given the distributional possibilities, should preschool be targeted on the disadvantaged rather
than be universally accessible?
I consider the implications of targeting preschool on Karoly and Bigelow’s disadvantaged group
(Table 8.5). That group is the lower 35 percent of the household income distribution. Targeting
considerably lowers preschool costs. The total costs of this targeted preschool program are only 26
percent of the costs of a universal preschool program. Costs are 26 percent of a universal program
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because of lower enrollment. Karoly and Bigelow’s assumptions imply that only 26 percent of enrollment
in a universal preschool program will be in this disadvantaged group.17
These lower program costs reduce the tax cost of preschool for all income groups. To calculate
these costs, I scale back the costs of universal preschool for each income group by 74 percent.
Targeting also means that benefits will be the same under all three sets of distributional
assumptions. As discussed above, the different sets of distributional assumptions differ in the dollar
benefits for non-disadvantaged groups relative to disadvantaged groups. If services are only targeted on
children from the disadvantaged group, then these distributional assumptions are irrelevant in determining
gross or net benefits.
I calculated net benefits, and the ratio of benefits to tax costs, for each income group from a
targeted preschool program. This targeted program has a very high overall ratio of benefits to costs—
more than seven (row 5 of Table 8.5). Targeting services to a disadvantaged group that is estimated, based
on several good studies, to have high returns to preschool obviously will result in a program that has high
overall returns.
The returns to the bottom two quintiles are particularly high. These two quintiles receive much
the same benefits from services as under a universal program. Benefits go down a little bit because of
lower economic development benefits from preschool spending. But this lowering of benefits is slight.
However, the targeting lowers tax costs by 74 percent. The ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs for the
two bottom quintiles more than triples (Table 8.5, row 5 vs. row 7). However, this corresponds to only
increasing the net benefits to these two groups by about one-tenth to one-fifth of 1 percent of income (row
4 vs. row 6, Table 8.5).
On the other hand, the targeting means there is no possibility of substantial economic
development benefits for the upper three quintiles. (There are no child benefits at all in these groups; there
are some assumed benefits from the spending.) On the other hand, the targeting holds down the tax
burden from preschool. Under a preschool program that is strictly limited to households in the lower third
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of the household income distribution, the top three quintiles all suffer net losses from paying taxes to
support the targeted program.
It should again be noted that this analysis focuses on economic development benefits. An analysis
that also considers the benefits of reduced crime would probably come up with larger benefits overall, and
some additional benefits for the upper three quintiles.
Given these data, which is better, targeted or universal preschool? I will consider two
perspectives. The first is that of some objective policymaker or policy analyst. This policy wonk is trying
to choose the policy that maximizes some weighted sum of overall efficiency benefits plus benefits from
making the income distribution more progressive. The other perspective is that of a political operative.
Which program will be easier to get enacted, and sustain and grow over time at a high-quality level?
From the first perspective, the targeted vs. universal preschool issue depends upon which world
we live in. Do we live in a world in which preschool only benefits the disadvantaged? Or do we live in a
world in which preschool has at least some significant benefits for the disadvantaged?
If we live in a world in which preschool only benefits the disadvantaged, then a targeted
preschool program is the better policy. In that world, the net overall benefits from a targeted program are
almost twice those of a universal program (0.352 percent vs. 0.203 percent, from row 4 vs. row 12, Table
8.5). All income groups will be better off with a targeted preschool program than with a universal
program (row 4 vs. row 12).
At the other extreme, if we live in a world in which preschool’s dollar benefits do not decline
with family income, then a universal program is the better policy. In that world, the universal program’s
overall net benefits are almost four times as great as those of the targeted program (row 10 vs. row 4,
Table 8.5). Both the targeted and the universal program have the same “bang for the buck,” delivering
over $7 in benefits for every dollar of costs (row 5 vs. row 11). But the universal program operates at
almost a four times greater scale. Four out of the five income groups gain more from the universal
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program than the targeted program, and the benefits for the lowest income group are almost the same in
either program.
But these are the extreme cases. More interesting is the set of baseline distributional assumptions.
What if we live in a world, as we probably do, in which preschool’s benefits do decline significantly with
income, but there are still considerable benefits for middle-income families? In that case, I think the
objective policymaker would probably favor universal preschool over targeted preschool. Targeted
preschool does have a higher “bang for the buck” than universal preschool. Targeted preschool has
overall benefits of over $7 for every dollar of cost. These benefits are over twice as great per dollar of
cost as those of universal preschool, at less than $3 per dollar of cost (row 5 vs. row 7). However, net
overall benefits of universal preschool are about 10 percent greater (0.396 percent of overall income vs.
0.352 percent, from the last column of row 8 vs. row 4). And under universal preschool, the second
lowest and middle income quintiles do better than under targeted preschool. The lowest income quintile’s
net benefits are almost unchanged. And the two highest income quintiles do somewhat worse under
universal preschool. Therefore, universal preschool would seem to be preferable on efficiency grounds to
targeted preschool, as net benefits are higher. And universal preschool would seem preferable on
distributional grounds to targeted preschool, as it redistributes more income from the highest income
quintiles to the low and middle income quintiles.
From a policy wonk’s perspective, there are net efficiency and distributional benefits to choosing
universal preschool over targeted preschool. Returns to preschool are lower as we extend services to
higher-income families. However, these returns are high enough that the gains for lower middle and
middle income quintiles outweigh the losses to the highest income quintiles. Cutting off preschool service
to middle-class families doesn’t make sense. The benefits of such services to middle-class families
outweigh the costs. The benefit-cost ratio is not as high as it is for lower-income families, but it still
exceeds one.
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But the practical political perspective is just as important. What conditions will make a program
easier to enact and sustain? From a political perspective, what is important is what people perceive to be
the benefits of universal preschool. Perceived benefits may differ from actual benefits.
From a political perspective, expanded preschool is more feasible and sustainable if it is
perceived as having broader benefits for the middle class and the proposal is for a broad program. In that
case, the universal program will probably benefit a majority of the population. A targeted program, in
contrast, relies for its support on some altruism from a majority of the population.
This political case for universal preschool over targeted preschool is strengthened if the public
and political actors believe universal preschool may be capitalized into higher property values.
Capitalization creates larger benefits of preschool for the politically powerful upper income quintile. The
ratio of benefits to tax costs for this quintile more than doubles (row 9 vs. row 7). Targeted preschool,
with its narrower eligibility, seems less likely to lead to capitalization. With capitalization, the net losses
from the upper income quintile due to adoption of a preschool program are slightly lower for a universal
program than for a targeted program (row 8 vs. row 4).
Three other factors may increase the policy wonk and political case for universal preschool over
targeted preschool: administrative costs and stigma costs of targeting, and reduced peer effects due to
targeting. My simulations of strict targeting assume that administrative costs are unchanged due to
administering some income-conditional preschool program. I assume these costs are slight because all the
program has to do is accept or reject some participant. However, if these costs prove to be significant,
they would lower net benefits of the targeted program, which would hurt the case for the targeting.
Targeting may also impose stigma costs on participation. The preschool program is now
identified as a program that serves the disadvantaged. Some disadvantaged parents may choose not to
participate in a targeted program but would participate in a universal program. If this occurs on a large
scale, then the benefits of targeted preschool may be significantly reduced.
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Finally, targeting vs. universal programs may affect peer effects. The work of Henry and
Rickman (2007) provides evidence of significant peer effects in preschool. Targeting, compared to
universal programs, means that the public preschool program will have less middle- and upper-class
participation with lower-class students. This may reduce positive peer effects on disadvantaged students.
On the other hand, this greater income integration may have negative peer effects on middle- and upperclass students. It is often assumed in discussions of income integration in K–12 education that peer effects
are asymmetric by income group (e.g., Kahlenberg 2001). It is assumed that the positive effects on the
lower-income students from the presence of middle-class and upper-income students will exceed the
negative effects on the middle- and upper-income students. The rationale for this asymmetry is that
academic achievement of lower-income students may be more sensitive to school culture. If this
asymmetry is true, then reducing income integration will lower the overall effectiveness of early
childhood experiences in preparing children for future success. Even if this asymmetry of peer effects is
untrue, peer effects mean that the reduction of income integration in a targeted program will hurt the
academic achievement of lower-income students.
For all these reasons, if universal preschool has some significant actual and perceived benefits for
middle-class students, then I think a universal program is preferable to targeting preschool on the
disadvantaged. A program with broader middle-class benefits makes more economic and political sense.
If such benefits are at all plausible in public debate, universal preschool is the way to go.
But what if the vision of broad benefits for preschool does not win out in the political
marketplace of ideas? For example, what if the “research consensus” moves toward finding that these
programs only benefit the disadvantaged? In that case, a targeted preschool program is a reasonable fallback position. Such a targeted program would deliver significant benefits to low income groups. (For
example, the net benefits for the lowest income quintile are almost 7 percent of income.) And the tax
costs for the middle and upper income quintiles are modest. The net losses for these three upper income
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quintiles are only about 1/20th of 1 percent of income. If the public does not believe that universal
preschool has broad benefits, this is all the public may be willing to pay for.

TARGETING WITHIN UNIVERSALISM: UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL WITH INCOMEGRADUATED FEES
What about a more moderate targeting effort that maintains universal accessibility? Specifically, I
did simulations that considered the possible effects of running a universal program with some fees for
children from upper-income families.
To try to preserve middle-class benefits, these fees are only imposed on families in the upper 40
percent of the income distribution (greater than $62,000 in household income.) In the baseline set of
assumptions, this upper 40 percent of households was the group with the lowest benefits from preschool.
In contrast, the lower three quintiles all had significant benefits from preschool. Therefore, restricting fees
to the upper 40 percent seems more likely to increase efficiency than a broader fee structure. Imposing
fees on the bottom three quintiles might discourage usage from the bottom three quintiles with the highest
benefits. Furthermore, it seems politically wise to only impose fees on a minority of the population. This
is consistent with the political advice given previously above, by Robert Greenstein, executive director of
the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, that “[t]argeted programs … are more likely to be strong
politically when they serve low-income and moderate-income working families as well as the very poor.”
The fees I considered were half of preschool costs for upper-income families. This ends up being
a fee of $4.52 per hour.18 This seems roughly consistent with what upper-income families might be
willing to consider paying. Data suggest that families in such income brackets average paying $3.90 per
hour for all types of paid child care.19 Paying a little more for high-quality preschool seems feasible.
Charging fees to upper-income families should reduce their demand for the preschool program. I
used estimates from a previous study by Blau and Hagy (1998) of how overall demand for all types of
child care responds to changes in hourly fees. However, we would assume that the change in usage of one
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type of child care, a public preschool, in response to a fee would be larger than the change in usage of all
types of child care in response to fees. Other types of child care and preschool are substitutes for the
public preschool program. The availability of these substitutes will increase the demand response.
Households can more readily reduce demand for any good or service if there are adequate substitutes for
that good or service. Therefore, I assumed that the change in public preschool demand due to the fee
would be twice the overall child care demand response estimated by Blau and Hagy.
With this assumption about the demand respond to fees, usage of preschool among households
with incomes greater than $62,000 (the top 40 percent) is reduced by 25 percent. This demand response
seems plausible. Overall usage (and costs) of preschool is reduced by 12 percent. Fee revenue comprises
21 percent of the overall costs of the program. Fees do have significant effects on the size and financing
of the program.
A targeted program that charges fees should have some extra administrative costs. The program
will have to determine household income and the appropriate fees, and collect those fees. I assumed that
these extra administrative costs from fees amount to about 5 percent of program costs.20
What are the effects of charging income-based fees in a universal preschool program? I do
simulations using the baseline distributional assumptions. (Table 8.6. Appendix 8B explores other
distributional assumptions.) The simulations suggest that the addition of these fees has little effect on the
overall net benefits of the program (row 7 vs. row 11; 0.397 percent net benefit vs. 0.396 percent). The
fees do promote economic efficiency to some extent by cutting back usage from upper income quintiles
whose benefits from the program are low. On the other hand, charging fees does add administrative costs
to the preschool program. Furthermore, the new program does reduce economic development benefits
somewhat. This occurs for some of the upper-income families that now forego preschool. It also occurs
for all income quintiles due to the reduced spending and size of the program. On net, all these factors turn
out to be a wash.
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However, adding fees does have some important redistributive effects. First, charging fees
redistributes some income from the two upper income quintiles to the three bottom income quintiles. This
redistribution is relatively modest. The net losses for the two top income quintiles, and the net gains for
the three bottom income quintiles, are all less than 0.1 percent of income (row 7 vs. row 11). This
redistribution takes place for two reasons. The reduced demand for preschool from upper-income families
reduces benefits for preschool for the upper two income quintiles, and reduces costs for preschool
services for the three lower income quintiles. The fees paid by the upper-income families also reduce net
benefits for the top two income quintiles, and reduce the taxes that the three lower income quintiles pay to
finance the program.
Second, charging fees redistributes how program cost is financed in the upper two income
quintiles. Some program cost is shifted from upper income households that do not use this preschool
program to families that do. For upper-income households that do not use preschool, what is relevant is
the change in their tax costs of the program. This tax cost is reduced by a little more than one-quarter for
these upper two income quintiles (row 3 vs. row 10). Although this is large as a percentage of the tax
burden of the program, it is modest in relation to income, again less than 0.1 percent of income. For
upper-income households that use preschool, they now are charged a fee for the program. However, they
still presumably are better off having the program than no program, or else they would not have chosen to
enroll their child and pay the fee. In addition, I note that the estimates suggest that the earnings benefits
for upper income families who use the program exceed the fees.21
Does charging income-based fees improve universal preschool? From a policy wonk’s
perspective, the fee-based program might be slightly preferable. The fee-based program does not affect
the overall net benefits of the program. However, the modest redistribution from the upper two quintiles
to the bottom three quintiles would be desirable.
From a political practicality perspective, it is unclear whether charging fees makes universal
preschool easier to enact and sustain. The political attractiveness of fees depends on the political influence
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of upper-class households who don’t use preschool vs. those who do. The upper-class “non-users” may be
more supportive of a universal preschool program that holds down costs by charging fees. They may be
less supportive of a free universal program that can be framed as subsidizing “affluent working women”
(Heckman 2005). On the other hand, the upper-class users of preschool may resent paying these incomebased fees while other families receive free services. This may reduce this group’s support for universal
preschool. Whether fees make sense from a political perspective depends on how fees and their rationale
are perceived by both preschool users and nonusers in the upper-class community.

THE ABECEDARIAN PROGRAM: DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF A LARGE SCALE
TARGETED PROGRAM
As described in Chapter 4 and its references, the Abecedarian program is an intense and costly
intervention targeted at children from disadvantaged families. The program provides full-time, full-year,
and high-quality child care and preschool from birth to age 5. The program potentially provides over
12,000 hours of service to each child. Because of the program’s intensity, the Abecedarian program is
very expensive per child. The present value of services for each child exceeds $60,000. Of course, in
return for those intense services, the program produces large economic development benefits. As outlined
in Chapter 4, of the various early childhood programs considered here, the Abecedarian program yields
the largest economic development benefits per child participant. This is partly due to the large effects on
future earnings of former child participants. But it also is due to the much larger effects on the labor
supply of parents of five years of free child care, compared to the more limited intervention of other early
childhood programs, such as one year of part-time, school-year preschool.
To analyze the income distributional effects of the Abecedarian program, I assume that services
would be restricted to the bottom quintile of the population. As outlined in Chapter 4, Ludwig and
Sawhill (2007) estimate that a full-scale Abecedarian program could achieve similar results to the original
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model by targeting families below the poverty line. This would involve providing services to families in
the lowest 15 percent of the family income distribution.
Why not an Abecedarian program that is universal? First, there is no basis for estimating the
effects of such a program. Second, as will be seen below, the costs of a full-scale Abecedarian program
for 15 percent of the population are already extremely high. A universal Abecedarian program would be
prohibitively expensive.
The simulations of the distributional effects of the Abecedarian program used similar methods to
those used for universal preschool. Therefore, the results can be compared (Table 8.7).
As previously shown in Chapter 4, a full-scale Abecedarian program results in quite large overall
net benefits. Overall net benefits are over twice those of universal preschool (row 4 vs. row 6).
Furthermore, a full-scale Abecedarian program results in extraordinary net benefits for the lowest
income quintile. The program boosts net income for this group by over 30 percent. This is well over four
times the effects on the lowest income quintile of universal preschool (row 4 vs. row 6).
Why are the effects of the Abecedarian program for the target group so high compared to
preschool? The greater effects for Abecedarian compared to preschool probably occur because of the
more intense services provided by the program to both children and their parents. Five years of full-time,
high-quality child care and preschool is a more extensive intervention in the lives of children than one
year of part-time, school-year preschool. Five years of full-time full-year free child care changes the
working opportunities for parents by more than one-year of part-time, school-year, free child care.
However, the Abecedarian program is so large and so redistributive that it imposes large net costs
on the upper 80 percent of the income distribution. The upper 80 percent of the population gets very little
direct economic development benefits from the Abecedarian program. (There are some economic
development benefits from the increased spending for these upper income groups, but these benefits are
small.) The upper 80 percent of the household income distribution suffers average net losses in income
due to a full-scale Abecedarian program of about one-half of 1 percent of income (row 4). This far
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exceeds the net losses for any income quintile from universal preschool. And of course universal
preschool results in net gains for the middle income quintile and below.
The Abecedarian program is so expensive per participant that its tax burden for the population is
over twice as great as universal preschool, even though universal preschool is projected to have over four
times as many participants. (See Table 4.2, and compare the overall tax cost in Tables 8.2 and 8.7.)
Because of its more limited number of participants, the Abecedarian program has many fewer direct
beneficiaries, and these beneficiaries are concentrated in the lowest income quintile.
This analysis, as is true of all the analysis in this book, only looks at economic development
benefits. Studies have not found evidence that the Abecedarian program reduces crime, so anticrime
benefits for the overall population cannot be counted on. There may be some benefits for other income
quintiles in reduced social service costs.
However, overall, a full-scale Abecedarian program appears to be economically promising but
politically troubled. The program could deliver large antipoverty benefits. However, achieving such
benefits puts great demands on the altruism of the majority of the population, which is ineligible for the
program.

THE NURSE FAMILY PARTNERSHIP AND THE PARENT CHILD HOME PROGRAM:
DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF SMALLER SCALE ANTI-POVERTY PROGRAMS
The Nurse Family Partnership (NFP) and Parent Child Home Program (PCHP) are quite different
programs. However, they have some similarities in their patterns of distributional effects. As detailed in
Chapter 4, the NFP provides disadvantaged first-time mothers with nurse home visits from the prenatal
period to age two. These visits focus on delivering a curriculum that includes healthier prenatal care, more
sensitive child care, and a better maternal life course. Direct hours of interaction during the visits with
each mother total perhaps 45 hours over this two and a half year period. Estimates suggest that a full-scale
NFP would perhaps include about 9 percent of all children.
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The PCHP provides disadvantaged mothers and children, with the child ages two and three, with
paraprofessional home visits. The paraprofessional brings a book or educational toy at each visit. Each
visit is tied to modeling with the mother how to interact with the child using the book or toy. Direct hours
of interaction with each mother-child pair during these visits total about 46 hours over this two-year
period. Estimates suggest that a full-scale PCHP would include about 5.5 percent of all children.
The nature of the services provided in these programs are obviously quite different. And they are
delivered by quite different personnel: nurses for NFP, and paraprofessionals for PCHP.
However, their pattern of distributional effects has some similarities. Both programs are much
less intense and costly in services per child than the Abecedarian program. Nurse Family Partnership has
a present value of $10,000 per child, and PCHP has a present value of $4,600 per child. This compares to
over $60,000 for the Abecedarian program. Both programs are also highly targeted on the disadvantaged
population compared to universal preschool. Each serves less than 10 percent of all children, whereas
universal preschool is estimated to serve about 70 percent of all children. As shown in Chapter 4, both
programs have an economic development to cost ratio that exceed one: 1.85 for NFP, and 5.66 for PCHP.
But the highly targeted nature of these programs, and their relatively modest costs per child, shapes the
magnitude and distribution of these programs’ economic development benefits.
I simulated the distributional impact of full-scale versions of the NFP and PCHP (Table 8.8). The
methodology was identical to that used for universal preschool and the Abecedarian program, to allow
comparisons.
These full-scale NFP and PCHP programs are assumed to deliver all of their benefits for children
and mothers to the lowest income quintile. This is because the full-scale programs that are modeled are
targeted programs. There is no basis to project what impact these programs would have if delivered
universally. Both programs were designed to address needs of disadvantaged families. Early experiments
with the NFP suggested that benefits were greater for more disadvantaged women (Karoly et al. 1998;
Olds et al. 1997).22
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As expected based on Chapter 4, these programs have net benefits overall. And given how these
programs are targeted, these benefits are delivered highly progressively (rows 4 and 8).
However, the lesser intensity of these programs has two consequences. First, each of these
programs only has moderate percentage effects on the income of the lowest income quintile, even though
this quintile receives most of the benefits of these two programs. Each program is estimated to increase
the incomes of the lowest income quintile by around two percent (rows 4 and 8). This is about one-third
of the effects on the lowest income quintile of universal preschool (row 10 vs. rows 4 and 8). These lesser
effects occur even though NFP and PCHP are far more targeted programs than universal preschool. But
the services provided by these programs per participant are far less extensive than universal preschool. It
is not surprising that the benefits are smaller for lower income groups.
Second, the cost of these programs for the remaining upper 80 percent of the income distribution
is quite modest. These programs each cost less than one-twentieth of 1 percent of income for these upper
income groups (rows 4 and 8). In contrast, the costs of the Abecedarian program for upper income
quintiles are over 10 times as great (row 12). Compared to the Abecedarian program, NFP and PCHP are
quite cheap because of the lesser costs per participant. Compared to universal preschool, NFP and PCHP
are inexpensive because they are far more targeted.
These findings suggest that politically, a full-scale NFP or PCHP program may be easier sells
than a full-scale Abecedarian program. The net sacrifice required does not put as much strain on voters’
altruism. On the other hand, the antipoverty effects of these interventions are more modest.

CONCLUSION
Previous chapters show that high-quality business incentives and early childhood programs can
deliver economic development benefits that exceed costs for state residents overall. This chapter shows
that all of these programs increase the progressivity of the income distribution and help the poor.
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All of the early childhood programs are far more progressive than business incentives in their
effects on the income distribution. This is partly because some of these early childhood programs are
designed to target assistance to disadvantaged families. But it also reflects the idea that programs to
develop human capital may by their very nature deliver more progressive benefits than programs that
boost labor demand. The progressivity of boosts to labor demand is more limited by the current capacities
of disadvantaged groups. Early childhood programs are not so limited. As a result, business incentives are
unlikely to deliver large boosts to the economic well-being of state residents who are poor.
How politically feasible is it for early childhood programs to be targeted on the poor? For
smaller-scale programs, such as NFP and PCHP, the program cost is low enough that such targeted efforts
are probably politically feasible. However, the trade-off is that the antipoverty benefits are modest. These
programs have the potential to play an important role in addressing the problems of lower income groups.
However, they clearly do not have sufficiently large effects to be the “solution” to poverty. This should
not be interpreted as a criticism of these programs. I doubt whether the program authors think that these
programs can “solve” poverty on their own.
For large-scale early childhood programs, such as the Abecedarian program and universal
preschool, their political feasibility may be improved if the program can be plausibly designed to deliver
broad benefits across many income groups. These larger-scale programs have a greater potential to
deliver large benefits to lower income groups. Whether this potential is politically enacted and sustained
depends on whether some combination of altruism and self-interest of the general population can be
mobilized to support these efforts. Universal accessibility, if not necessarily universal free access, may be
helpful in making credible the notion of broad benefits including improvements in property values. But if
political perceptions change so that broad benefits are not plausible, either because of changing research
findings or changing perceptions of these findings, then a more targeted program may be the only
politically sustainable fall-back position. However, targeted programs may be more limited than universal
programs in the costs that a majority of the public is willing to pay. This more limited willingness to pay
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may limit the quality and hence effectiveness of a targeted program. It may also limit how many
disadvantaged children are able to access a targeted program. Universal early childhood programs may be
more politically effective than targeted programs in delivering assistance to the poor.
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NOTES

1. For a useful and insightful recent discussion of the consequences of income inequality, and
recent trends in income inequality in the United States and other industrial democracies, see Kenworthy
(2008).
2. The estimated annual cost of universal preschool if implemented nationwide is $17.9 billion.
As stated in Chapter 2, annual costs of state and local business incentives are probably $20–$30 billion.
Most of these business incentive dollars come in the form of financial incentives.
3. Figures on what percentage of each household is in each quintile are reported online by the
U.S. Bureau of the Census, from the 2008 Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current
Population Survey. This reports data for calendar year 2007. The relevant figures are in Table 2 and Table
A-3 of DeNava-Walt, Proctor, and Smith (2008). The cutoffs for each income quintile are as follows:
quintile 1 (lowest income), less than $20,300; quintile 2, from $20,300 to less than $39,100; quintile 3
(middle income), from $39,100 to less than $62,000; quintile 4, from $62,000 to less than $100,000;
quintile 5 (highest income), $100,000 or more. These income cutoffs are provided online in Table HINC–
05, available at the Census Bureau Web site at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/macro/032008/hhinc/new05_000.htm. Mean income of each quintile,
available in Table A-3 of Denava-Walt et al. (2008) is: quintile 1, $11,551; quintile 2, $29,442; quintile 3,
$49,968; quintile 4, $79,111; quintile 5, $167,971. The implied mean income of all households is
$67,609, which is increased relative to the middle income quintile mean by the high incomes of the top
quintiles.
4. All these calculations use figures for current income, and the present value of such, for the
relevant group. I used current income rather than permanent income because it is more straightforward to
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measure, and there are better data on effects of policies and programs relative to current income.
Permanent income is a concept that is never directly measured but only inferred. Trying to measure
distributional effects relative to permanent income adds complications about how to measure permanent
income. Is consumption a valid measure of permanent income? How can we incorporate borrowing
constraints into a model of effective permanent income? The distributional calculations relative to current
income probably exaggerate the progressivity of all programs relative to the permanent income
distribution. However, the relative progressivity of the different programs would probably hold even if
measured against permanent income.
5. Specifically, I first used this book’s model to calculate the present value of earnings increases
due to business incentives, as a percentage of the present value of earnings. This was then multiplied by
0.735. This factor of 0.735 reflects the estimated labor share of income (Gordon 2009). I use Gordon’s
figures for the average labor share from 1998–2008. Looking at Commerce Department figures on
personal income and compensation, and allowing for proprietors’ income to have two-thirds’ labor share,
yielded similar labor share figures. The overall percentage effect on income for all households was then
allocated across income quintiles based on the results in Bartik (1994). I used my estimates from this
paper of how income percentages varied by quintile to calculate percentage effects in each income
quintile. These percentage figures were then translated into dollar impact figures using each quintile’s
estimated share of total income.
6. These estimates use fairly standard incidence assumptions. However, as noted by Reschovsky
(1998), they may yield more regressive impacts of state and local taxes than is consistent with many
economists’ views of tax incidence. Therefore, these estimates are somewhat tilted toward not finding
progressive effects of these various economic development programs. As a result, the finding in this
chapter of progressive impacts of all these programs is strengthened. I also considered incidence using
Pechman’s estimates (Pechman 1985, variant 3b, p. 61). I had used Pechman’s estimates in Bartik (1994).
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Pechman’s estimates are somewhat more regressive at the lower end, and more progressive between the
middle and high end. The Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP) numbers imply the
following relative tax rates by quintile, where the overall tax rate average is indexed as 1.00: quintile 1
(lowest), 1.26; quintile 2, 1.15; quintile 3, 1.10; quintile 4, 1.04; quintile 5 (highest), 0.91. Pechman’s
numbers imply the following relative tax rates by quintile: quintile 1, 1.48; quintile 2, 1.11; quintile 3,
0.97; quintile 4, 0.91; quintile 5, 1.00. None of the qualitative and quantitative findings of this chapter are
altered significantly by using the Pechman incidence assumptions rather than the ITEP incidence
assumptions. The interested reader can use the numbers in this endnote to recalculate the numbers.
The allocation first calculates the present value of taxes paid overall for business incentives,
divided by the present value of future earnings. This percentage is then multiplied by 0.735 to reflect the
share of labor compensation in total income. The overall percentage share of taxes in income is then used
to calculate the percentage share of taxes in income of each quintile using the relative percentage tax rates
in McIntyre et al. (2003). The specific ITEP numbers I used were state and local taxes before considering
the potential federal income tax offset. This is the row labeled “Total taxes” in the table for “Averages for
All States.” Therefore, there may be some additional net benefits from all these programs, both business
incentives and early childhood programs, from federal tax deductibility, particularly for higher income
quintiles.
The ITEP figures for tax burden by income quintile are for nonelderly couples and individuals.
Therefore, the procedure I use is implicitly assuming that tax burdens by household income quintile
follow the pattern for tax burdens by income quintile for nonelderly couples and individuals.
7. These calculations focus on the economic development benefits. They do not include the
effects on capital gains that were included in my 1994 paper. But including in capital gains does not make
much difference. The real earnings effects calculated here already adjust for changes in local prices,
including changes in local housing prices. Therefore, capital gains due to increases in property values are
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a net addition to benefits, above and beyond what has been counted so far. These capital gains have an
estimated present value of only about one-twentieth of 1 percent of the present value of income. The
ratios of gross earnings benefits plus capital gains to tax costs, by income quintile, are: quintile 1 (lowest),
6.30; quintile 2, 3.83; quintile 3, 3.83; quintile 4, 4.13; quintile 5, 2.08; overall, 3.35. These ratios are not
much of an increase from what is reported in Table 8.1.
8. This research design is referred to as a regression discontinuity design. It is reasonably
rigorous evidence of true causal effects. Although there are other studies of how preschool effects differ
with economic status, all these other studies are potentially subject to much more serious selection effects.
Parents choose to send their children to preschool. As a result of this choice, preschool attendees differ
from nonpreschool attendees in many ways, both observed and (most critically) unobserved. This
selection will bias estimates of preschool effects. There is no reason to think that this selection bias will
be of similar magnitude or even sign across different income groups.
9. Gormley and his colleagues do not report the statistical significance of these differentials
across different income groups. My own calculations suggest that in comparisons across any two groups
for any of the tests, the results are not statistically significantly different across income groups. This can
be computed by calculating the difference of estimates, and then calculating the variance assuming the
coefficient estimates are uncorrelated. They would appear to be uncorrelated in that each estimate comes
from separate regression estimates using a different sample. With the three tests involved and three
groups, there are nine possible comparisons of two groups for a given test. Six of these nine comparisons
have t-statistics on the differences of less than one in absolute value. The largest in absolute value tstatistic is 1.47, which is statistically significant only at the 14 percent level.
10. Appendix 8A summarizes their distributional assumptions, and explains how I use them to
generate some distributional results by quintile.
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11. Earnings effects per quintile do not fall off quite so fast per household in each quintile. The
Karoly and Bigelow enrollment assumptions imply that although a higher percentage of four-year-olds
who are low income enroll in universal preschool, this enrollment is a lower percentage of households in
the lowest income quintile. This probably reflects that the lowest income quintile includes a considerable
number of single person households. The pattern of dollar benefits per household, relative to the lowest
income quintile, follow this pattern: quintile 1, 1.00; quintile 2, 0.87; quintile 3, 0.43; quintile 4, 0.12;
quintile 5, 0.12. See appendix 8A for more details.
12. Because of the way in which these distributional effects are calculated, the model implicitly
assumes that such phenomena as peer effects and displacement effects occur within each quintile. If peer
effects or displacement effects occur across quintiles, this will broaden the benefits of preschool
somewhat. However, there is no way to reliably estimate the extent of such broadening. It seems unlikely
that such broadening would significantly reduce the highly progressive nature of benefits for preschool
and other early childhood programs.
13. This 7 percent figure does not measure the annual percentage effect of preschool on
participants. The 7 percent is the present value of the effect on state residents as a percent of the present
value of the income of that quintile. This will be below the long-run annual effects on former child
participants for several reasons. First, some former child participants move out of state. Second, the
model allows for displacement effects. Third, because the effect on former child participants is longdelayed, this reduces the present value percentage effect relative to the long-run annual percentage effect.
Calculations of annual percentage effects on participants suggest that they average 17.3 percent from ages
16 to 79. This is an unweighted average. The percentage effects do not vary greatly across years.
Percentage effects on earnings for each year range from 13.6 percent to 23.5 percent.
14. Estimated effects for the lowest income quintile are somewhat reduced relative to CPC
because the CPC estimates are only assumed to fully apply to lower income children who otherwise
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would have attended no preschool. Some members of the lowest income quintile would otherwise have
attended some other preschool program. The estimated benefits for these children are assumed to be lower
than the CPC program’s estimated effects. Overall, the average benefits per participant for the lowest
income quintile are about 61 percent of the estimated benefits per participant of the CPC program.
15. Preschool’s benefits lead to a 0.618 percent boost to the present value of overall earnings, as
a percentage of the present value of income (Table 8.2, row 2). The property value increase is equivalent
to 0.259 percent of the present value of income (row 3). Therefore, capitalization into higher property
values captures about 47 percent of the earnings effects of preschool (47 percent = 0.259 divided by
0.618). Overall property value increases do not capture all the overall earnings effects of preschool
because we assume different discount rates. From a social perspective, we use 3 percent to discount future
earnings. But we assume that property buyers and sellers use a higher discount rate in determining
property bids. Individuals may be more myopic in their market behavior than is socially optimal.
16. Why doesn’t capitalization differentiate by income groups to capture differential benefits?
Differential capitalization is implausible given that land can be reallocated from one housing type to
another. In terms of Table 8.3, if capitalization differentiates by income group, then capitalization implies
that housing prices of the lowest income quintile would have to go up by much more in percentage terms
than those of the average household, while housing prices of the highest income quintile would go up by
much less in percentage terms than for the average household. Presumably these housing price changes
are due to differential land price changes, as in the long run the price of structure capital should be related
to replacement costs. In any event, it would be very difficult to sustain the large implied differences in
land prices between income groups implied by nonuniform capitalization. Perhaps in theory some
perfectly enforced zoning and new housing regulations could do so. In practice, the required land price
differentials seem likely to overwhelm any such regulatory barriers.
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17. This largely occurs because the lower-income household groups seem to have fewer fouryear-olds. This probably occurs because lower-income households have a greater percentage of single
individual households.
18. This fee is based on the preschool being three hours a day, 180 days a year, and costing in
2007 dollars $4,747. This cost is what was assumed in my original report in 2006. These cost estimates
were derived by Karoly and Bigelow (2005). This is roughly consistent with what a high-quality
preschool is assumed to cost in Gault et al. (2008). There, a similar three-hour per day school year
program, and a lead teacher paid public school wages, costs $4,071 per year per child at a class size of 20
to 2, $4,506 per year per child at a class size of 17 to 2, and $4,893 per year per child at a class size of 15
to 2. The fee calculation also adds in extra administrative costs of 5 percent above this $4,747 per child to
monitor family income and regularly collect the fees.
19. This figure is taken from PPL Table 6B from the online version of Smith (2002)
(http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/child/ppl-964/tab06.pdf).
Specifically, I looked at the weekly child care expenditures divided by weekly child care hours
for children less than five, and for families with annual incomes greater than $69,763 per year in 2007
dollars. (In the table, these are families with an average monthly income of greater than $4,500 in 1997
dollars.) I then updated this hourly figure to 2007 dollars using the CPI.
20. Karoly and Bigelow (2005) assumed that charging fees will increase administrative costs by
10 percent. However, this appears to be based on a statement by Barnett (1993) that refers to overall
administrative costs of welfare programs, not the extra administrative costs to simply charging fees.
Studies of administrative costs as a percentage of benefits in the U.S. suggest that non-means-tested
programs such as Social Security have administrative costs of 2.5 percent of benefits, while welfare and
unemployment insurance programs have administrative costs of 12.1 percent and 11.8 percent of benefits
(Kesselman [1982], of which I was made aware by Besley and Kanbur [1990]). This might suggest that
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means testing adds 9–10 percent in administrative costs as a percentage of benefits. However, many of the
administrative costs of welfare and unemployment insurance programs are due to complex work search
rules, as well as administrative procedures that in part are meant to discourage usage. Therefore, I suspect
that the extra administrative costs of charging fees to upper-income families in a universal preschool
program would be considerably less than 9–10 percent. An extra 5 percent is a somewhat arbitrary but
reasonable assumption.
21. This can be derived by comparing row 2 vs. the fees paid, given by the difference between
row 7 and row 3. For income quintile 4, the earnings benefits from preschool with fees are 0.105 percent
of income, whereas fees are 0.090 percent of income. For income quintile 5, the earnings benefits from
preschool are 0.048 percent of income, whereas fees are 0.042 percent of income.
22. It might be interesting to explore further impacts of other home visiting programs if delivered
universally. For example, the Parents as Teachers program has at 57 percent of its sites been run as a
universal access program (Parents as Teachers National Center 2008).
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Table 8.1 Distributional Effects of Business Incentives
Lowest
Row #
1

Quintile % share of total household income

1
3.4

2
8.7

Income quintile
Middle
3
4
14.8
23.4

Highest
5
49.7

Overall
100

Business incentive effects on:
Relative dollar effects on earnings, disadvantaged group=1
1.00
1.39
2.25
3.64
3.10
2.38
Earnings benefits as % of income
1.726
0.940
0.892
0.914
0.366
0.698
Tax costs as % of income
0.281
0.256
0.244
0.232
0.202
0.222
Net benefits as % of income
1.445
0.684
0.648
0.682
0.165
0.476
Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs
6.15
3.67
3.66
3.95
1.82
3.14
NOTE: Dollar benefits per participant for each quintile are indexed to lowest income quintile equals one. All figures for percentages of income report present
value of that item as percentages of present value of income for the relevant group. Ratios report ratios of present value of earnings benefits or net income benefit
to present value of tax costs for the relevant group. All present value calculations use 3% real discount rate. Overall earnings effects and tax costs come from the
simulation model for business incentives of this book. Earnings are translated into income percentages using labor share figures of Gordon (2009). Earnings
effects are allocated across quintiles based on how income effects of labor demand increases are allocated across quintiles in Bartik (2004). Tax costs are
allocated across quintiles based on average quintile incidence of state and local taxes reported in McIntyre et al. (2003). More details are in text and endnotes to
text.
2
3
4
5
6

Table 8.2 Distributional Effects of Universal Preschool, Baseline Distributional Assumptions (with Comparisons to Business Incentives)
Income quintile
Lowest
Row #

Middle

Highest

1

2

3

4

5

3.4

8.7

14.8

23.4

49.7

Overall

1

Quintile % share of total household income

100

2

Relative dollar effects on earnings, disadvantaged group=1

1.00

0.81

0.31

0.08

0.08

0.38

3

Earnings benefits as % of income

7.046

2.404

0.710

0.138

0.064

0.618

4

Tax costs as % of income

0.281

0.256

0.244

0.232

0.202

0.222

5

Net benefits as % of income

6.765

2.147

0.466

-0.094

-0.138

0.396

6

Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs

9.38

2.91

0.59

0.32

2.78

Preschool effects on:

25.08

Comparison with business incentive effects on:
7

Net benefits as % of income

1.445

0.684

0.648

0.682

0.165

0.476

8

Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs

6.15

3.67

3.66

3.95

1.82

3.14

NOTE: Top rows of table show effects of universal preschool under the baseline distributional assumptions. Bottom rows show distributional effects of business

incentives, and are taken from Table 8.1. Dollar benefits per participant for each quintile are indexed to lowest income quintile equals one. All figures for
percentages of income report present value of that item as percentages of present value of income for the relevant group. Ratios report ratios of present value of
earnings benefits or net income benefit to present value of tax costs for the relevant group. All present value calculations use 3% real discount rate. Overall
earnings effects and tax costs come from the simulation model for universal preschool used in this book, and described in Chapter 4. Earnings are translated into
income percentages using labor share figures of Gordon (2009). Earnings effects for former child participants and parents are allocated across quintiles based on
the Karoly and Bigelow (2005) distributional assumptions, which are applied to quintiles as explained in Appendix 8A. Balanced budget multiplier spending
effects on earnings are allocated across quintiles based on how labor demand increases are allocated across quintiles in Bartik (2004). Tax costs are allocated
across quintiles based on average quintile incidence of state and local taxes reported in McIntyre et al. (2003). More details are in text and endnotes to text.

Table 8.3 Distributional Effects with Capitalization Effects of Universal Preschool
Lowest
Row #
1

Quintile % share of total household income

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Preschool effects with capitalization on:
Earnings benefits as % of income
Costs of increased housing prices to consumers
Benefits of increased housing prices to property owners
Net benefits before taxes and after capitalization (row 2-row3+row4)
Tax costs as % of income
Net benefits as % of income
Ratio of before-tax benefits to tax costs

1
3.4

7.046
0.753
0.239
6.531
0.281
6.250
23.25

2
8.7

2.404
0.398
0.232
2.237
0.256
1.981
8.73

Income quintile
Middle
3
4
14.8
23.4

0.710
0.295
0.228
0.643
0.244
0.400
2.64

0.138
0.247
0.232
0.123
0.232
-0.109
0.53

Highest
5
49.7

0.064
0.196
0.289
0.157
0.202
-0.045
0.78

Overall
100

0.618
0.259
0.259
0.618
0.222
0.396
2.78

Comparison to preschool effects without capitalization
9 Net benefits as % of income
6.765
2.147
0.466
-0.094
-0.138
0.396
10 Ratio of before-tax benefits to tax costs
25.08
9.38
2.91
0.59
0.32
2.78
NOTE: Top rows of table show effects of universal preschool when housing prices increase. Bottom rows show effects without such capitalization effects, and are
taken from Table 8.2. Earnings effects and tax costs for capitalization case are also taken from Table 8.2. Overall capitalization effects are based on assumption
of property buyers and sellers having full knowledge of overall earnings effects of universal preschool, and using a 4.7% discount rate to value such effects. This
leads to 6.1% increase in property values, as explained in Chapter 7 (Table 7.3 and surrounding text). This property value increase is recalculated as a percentage
of the present value of overall income, using figures on earnings and a labor share of income of 73.5% (Gordon 2009). The effects of this housing price increase
is allocated across consumers based on each income quintile’s share of total shelter expenditures in the Consumer Expenditure Survey for 2007 (see the Web site
of the Bureau of Labor Statistics at http://www.bls.gov/cex/2007/Standard/quintile.pdf). The effects of this housing price increase is allocated across property
owners based on figures used in Bartik (2004) on how home ownership, ownership of rental property, and ownership of business real estate are divided across
income quintiles. How these calculations are done is detailed in Bartik (1994), but the allocation is largely based on Current Population Survey information on
each income quintile’s share of rental and dividend income, and self-employment income, and on each income quintile’s home ownership, combined with
American Housing Survey data on home values by income quintile.

Table 8.4 Distributional Effects of Universal Preschool under Alternative Distributional Assumptions
Income quintile
Lowest
Row#
1

Quintile % share of total household income

Middle

Highest

1

2

3

4

5

3.4

8.7

14.8

23.4

49.7

Overall
100

Preschool effects under
Baseline distributional assumptions on:
2

Relative dollar effect on earnings, disadvantaged group=1

1.00

0.81

0.31

0.08

0.08

0.38

3

Net benefits as % of income

6.765

2.147

0.466

-0.094

-0.138

0.396

4

Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs

25.08

9.38

2.91

0.59

0.32

2.78

“Equal dollar” distributional assumptions
5

Relative dollar effect on earnings, disadvantaged group=1

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

6

Net benefits as % of income

6.765

2.713

1.959

1.411

0.571

1.370

7

Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs

8
9

25.08

11.59

9.03

7.09

3.83

7.16

Relative dollar effect on earnings, disadvantaged group=1

1.00

0.67

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.26

Net benefits as % of income

6.765

1.755

-0.219

-0.217

-0.195

0.203

“Only disadvantaged benefit” distributional assumptions

10 Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs
25.08
7.85
0.10
0.06
0.03
1.91
NOTE: Top rows of table show effects of universal preschool under the baseline distributional assumptions. These figures are taken from Table 8.2. The next two
sets of results resimulate these effects under alternative distributional assumptions. These alternative distributional assumptions assume the same dollar effects
per participant for children in the lowest income quintile. What changes is what these dollar effects per participant are for other income quintiles. The “equal
dollar” assumptions assume that the dollar effect per participant is the same for all quintiles. The “only disadvantaged benefit” distributional assumption assume
that the dollar effects per participant only occur for the disadvantaged group in Karoly and Bigelow (2005), which is in the bottom 35% of the household income
distribution. Tax costs are not reported in this table, but are the same as in Table 8.2. All percentage effects are for present value of relevant value as percentage
of present value of income.

Table 8.5 Distributional Effects of Targeted Preschool Program vs. Universal Preschool Program, under Alternative Distributional Assumptions

Row #

Lowest

Targeted or
universal program? Distributional assumptions

1

Income quintile
Middle

Highest

1

2

3

4

5

Quintile % share of total household income

3.4

8.7

14.8

23.4

49.7

Overall

0.072
0.281

0.066
0.256

0.063
0.244

0.060
0.232

0.052
0.202

0.057
0.222

100

2
3

Targeted and
universal

Consistent with all 3 sets

Tax costs of targeted as % of income
Tax costs of universal as % of income

4
5

Targeted

Consistent with all 3 sets

Preschool net benefits as % of income
Preschool’s ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs

6.873
96.15

1.905
29.91

-0.060
0.05

-0.056
0.05

-0.051
0.03

0.352
7.16

6
7

Universal

Baseline

Preschool net benefits as % of income
Preschool’s ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs

6.765
25.08

2.147
9.38

0.466
2.91

-0.094
0.59

-0.138
0.32

0.396
2.78

8
9

Universal with
capitalization

Baseline

Preschool net benefits as % of income
Preschool’s ratio of earnings and housing price
effects to tax costs

6.250
23.25

1.981
8.73

0.400
2.64

-0.109
0.53

-0.045
0.78

0.396
2.78

10
11

Universal

“Equal dollar”

Preschool net benefits as % of income
Preschool’s ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs

6.765
25.08

2.713
11.59

1.959
9.03

1.411
7.09

0.571
3.83

1.370
7.16

12
13

Universal

“Only disadvantaged benefit” Preschool net benefits as % of income
Preschool’s ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs

6.765
25.08

1.755
7.85

-0.219
0.10

-0.217
0.06

-0.195
0.03

0.203
1.91

NOTE: The top rows consider tax costs of a targeted vs. a universal program. The next rows consider the effects of a targeted program on net income and the ratio
of earnings effects to tax costs. For comparison, the following rows compare these effects to effects of universal preschool program under various distributional
assumptions. The baseline distributional assumption results for universal preschool are taken from Table 8.2. The results with capitalization are taken from Table
8.3. The results for the “equal dollar” and “only disadvantaged benefit” distributional assumptions are taken from Table 8.4. The targeted program only includes
preschool for the disadvantaged group, which is in the bottom 35% of the household income distribution and makes up 26% of the enrollment in a universal
program. Therefore, the tax costs in the top row are simply 26% of the universal program’s costs. The net benefits and benefit to cost ratios for the targeted
program are simulated by assuming the same effects for disadvantaged children and parents as under the universal program, but setting such effects for all other
groups to zero because they will not be enrolled. The balanced budget multiplier effects of spending are also reduced to 26% of the original spending effects for
all groups. As in all the tables in this chapter, effects as % of income are present value of relevant variable effects as percentage of present value of income.
Ratios are ratios of present values of relevant variables. Present value calculations use 3% discount rate.

Table 8.6 Distributional Effects of Universal Preschool with Income-Based Fees
Lowest
Row #

Fees or free?

1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Quintile % share of total household income

Fees

Effects of universal preschool with fees on:
Earnings benefits as % of income
Tax costs as % of income
Net benefits after taxes as % of income
Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs
Tax plus fee costs as % of income
Net benefits after taxes and fees as % of income
Ratio of earnings benefits to tax plus fee costs

1
3.4

2
8.7

7.030
0.205
6.825
34.25
0.205
6.825
34.25

2.398
0.187
2.211
12.81
0.187
2.211
12.81

Income quintile
Middle
3
4
14.8
23.4

0.708
0.178
0.530
3.97
0.178
0.530
3.97

0.105
0.169
-0.065
0.62
0.259
-0.155
0.40

Highest
5
49.7

0.048
0.147
-0.099
0.33
0.190
-0.141
0.26

Overall
100

0.601
0.162
0.439
3.70
0.205
0.397
2.94

Effects of universal preschool that is free on:
9
Free (baseline) Earnings benefits as % of income
7.046
2.404
0.710
0.138
0.064
0.618
10
Tax costs as % of income
0.281
0.256
0.244
0.232
0.202
0.222
11
Net benefits after taxes as % of income
6.765
2.147
0.466
-0.094
-0.138
0.396
12
Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs
25.08
9.38
2.91
0.59
0.32
2.78
NOTE: The first set of rows examines the effects of an universal preschool program with income-based fees. These rows analyze net benefits, and ratio of benefits
to costs, in two ways. One way simply looks at benefits vs. tax costs. The other way includes fees as part of costs. The inclusion of fees is proper from an overall
social benefits analysis. However, the analysis without fees is more relevant for households who do not use universal preschool. The second set of rows
considers the case of universal preschool without any fees. These estimates are taken from Table 8.2. The fees are set and analyzed as described in the text. The
reduced usage induced by fees requires that both tax costs and balanced budget multiplier effects be recalculated for all groups. In addition, the earnings benefits
of preschool must be recalculated for all groups. I assume usage of preschool due to fees is distributed equally across the top two income quintiles. The effects as
percentage of income are present value of relevant variable as percentage of present value of income. The ratios are ratio of present value of benefits to present
value of costs. Present value calculations use 3% discount rate.

Table 8.7 Distributional Effects of Abecedarian Program
Income quintile
Lowest
Row #

Middle

Highest

1

2

3

4

5

3.4

8.7

14.8

23.4

49.7

Overall

1

Quintile share of total household income

100

2

Earnings as % of income

31.762

0.029

0.027

0.028

0.011

1.100

3

Tax costs as % of income

0.617

0.563

0.536

0.509

0.443

0.489

4

Net benefits as % of income

31.145

-0.534

-0.509

-0.481

-0.432

0.611

5

Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs

51.45

0.05

0.05

0.06

0.03

2.25

2.147

0.466

-0.094

-0.138

0.396

9.38

2.91

0.59

0.32

2.78

Abecedarian program’s effects on:

Comparison to universal preschool’s effects on:
6

Net benefits as % of income

7

Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs

6.765
25.08

NOTE: The top rows show distributional effects for a full-scale Abecedarian program. The bottom rows show distributional effects for a universal preschool

program. These bottom rows are taken from Table 8.2. The overall size, effects, and costs of an Abecedarian program are derived in Chapter 4. The earnings
effects due to effects on former child participants and their parents are derived by assuming all of these effects are allocated to the lowest income quintile; see
text for rationale for this assumption. Balanced budget multiplier effects of spending are allocated across quintiles based on results in Bartik (1994) of
distributional effects of labor demand. Tax costs are allocated across quintiles based on results in McIntyre et al. (2003). These procedures are similar to what
was done for universal preschool in Table 8.2. All effects as percentage of income are effects on present value of relevant variable as percentage of present value
of income. All ratio effects are ratios of effects on present value of benefits to present value of costs. Present value calculations use 3% discount rate.

Table 8.8 Distributional Effects for Nurse Family Partnership (NFP) and Parent Child Home Program (PCHP)
Lowest
Row #

1
3.4

2
8.7

Income quintile
Middle
3
4
14.8
23.4

Highest
5
49.7

Overall

1

Quintile % share of total household income

100

2
3
4
5

NFP’s effects on:
Earnings as % of income
Tax costs as % of income
Net benefits as % of income
Ratio of earnings effects to tax costs

2.456
0.058
2.398
42.14

0.003
0.053
-0.050
0.05

0.003
0.051
-0.048
0.05

0.003
0.048
-0.045
0.05

0.001
0.042
-0.041
0.03

0.085
0.046
0.039
1.85

6
7
8
9

PCHPS’s effects on:
Earnings as % of income
Tax costs as % of income
Net benefits as % of income
Ratio of earnings effects to tax costs

2.115
0.016
2.098
130.85

0.001
0.015
-0.014
0.05

0.001
0.014
-0.013
0.05

0.001
0.013
-0.013
0.06

0.000
0.012
-0.011
0.03

0.072
0.013
0.060
5.66

10
11

Comparison: Universal preschool’s effects on:
Net benefits as % of income
Ratio of earnings effects to tax costs

6.666
24.73

2.288
9.93

0.447
2.83

-0.107
0.54

-0.144
0.29

0.396
2.78

Comparison: Abecedarian effects on:
12
Net benefits as % of income
31.145
-0.534
-0.509
-0.481
-0.432
0.611
13
Ratio of earnings effects to tax costs
51.45
0.05
0.05
0.06
0.03
2.25
NOTE: The top rows show effects for full-scale implementation of the Nurse Family Partnership (NFP). The next set of rows show effects for full-scale
implementation of the Parent Child Home Program (PCHP). The next set of rows show effects for universal preschool. The final set of rows show effects from
the Abecedarian program. The universal preschool effects and Abecedarian effects come from Table 8.2 and Table 8.7, respectively. The NFP and PCHP effects
on overall earnings and taxes are derived from the simulation models outlined in Chapter 4. These effects are expressed as percentages of income by using data
from Gordon (2009) on the labor share. NFP and PCHP effects on former child participants and parents are allocated across quintile under the assumption that all
such effects occur in the lowest income quintile. Balanced budget multiplier effects of NFP and PCHP are allocated across quintiles based on estimates in Bartik
(2004) of how labor demand affects income of different quintiles. Tax costs are allocated across quintiles based on estimates by McIntyre et al. (2003). All
effects for percentage of income are the present value of the relevant variable as a percentage of the present value of income. All ratios of earnings to tax costs
are the present value of earnings effects to the present value of tax costs. All present value calculations use a 3% social discount rate.

APPENDIX 8A
DISTRIBUTING PRESCHOOL BENEFITS BY HOUSEHOLD INCOME QUINTILE
The baseline distributional effects of universal preschool are based on a model used by Karoly
and Bigelow (2005). The same model is crucial to estimating the overall effects of universal preschool, as
outlined in Chapter 4. This is because all the estimates of overall effects of universal preschool are based
on how effects for middle- and upper-class groups compare to effects on lower-class groups. The lowerclass group effects are derived from studies of the Chicago Child Parent Center (CPC) program and the
Perry Preschool program. Both the distributional and overall effects then depend upon the extent to which
these middle- and upper-class group effects are below those of the CPC and Perry programs.
Table 8A.1 summarizes the distributional assumptions made by Karoly and Bigelow. (A version
of this table was previously included as Table 7 in my 2006 paper.) These numbers dictate exactly how
much overall benefit there is in each income classification, and what overall benefit there is from
universal preschool, compared to the expected benefit for a low-income child from participating in
universal preschool vs. no preschool at all. It is assumed that the CPC and Perry estimates reveal the
benefits of high-quality preschool for a low-income child versus having no preschool experience at all.
I combine these assumptions with estimates of the household income distribution to generate
numbers for how preschool impact and enrollment is divided among these three groups, and how this
compares with how households are divided among these groups (Table 8A.2). Preschool’s total impact is
defined as the product of the benefit percentage in the above table for each cell times the percentage of all
four-year-olds in that cell. This calculation results in an index of the size of the impact in each income
category, which can then be reindexed to a 100 percent total for all three groups. To calculate how
households are divided among the three groups, I use published data on the household income distribution
from the Current Population Survey to calculate what percent of all households are in these three groups.1
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These figures are then used to generate an index for relative benefits or impact per participant,
relative participation or enrollment in preschool per household, and relative benefits or impact or benefits
per household (Table 8A.3). These figures are derived by dividing how the numerator variable is
allocated across the three groups by how the denominator is divided among the three groups, and then
reindexing so that the index for the lowest income group equals 1.00.
I then translate these figures into similar relative indices for the different income quintiles. I
generate these numbers by acting as if the relative benefit and participation per household figures are
uniform within each of the three income groups. These three income groups are then parceled out among
the five income quintiles. The figure for the income quintile will then be a weighted average of the
income groups making up that quintile, with the weights equal to the proportion of each income group in
that quintile. As the lowest income quintile and the top two income quintiles are each made up of only
one of the three income groups, no weighted average calculation is needed for those three income
quintiles. However, income quintiles 2 and 3 are each a weighted average of two of the three income
groups. The figures for relative benefits per participant are then calculated by dividing relative benefits
per household by relative enrollment per household.
This calculation procedure is admittedly somewhat arbitrary. It is based upon Karoly and
Bigelow’s assumptions, which are plausible and reasonable guesses to how enrollment and benefits will
vary across income groups.
However, the bottom line is that the benefits per participant and benefits per household indices
follow a plausible pattern across income quintiles. The benefits decline greatly going from the lowest
income quintile to the middle income quintile, but not to zero. The benefits undergo an even more drastic
decline for the top two income quintiles, so that benefits for upper income quintiles are but a small
percentage of those for the lowest income quintile. This pattern is qualitatively consistent with the
positions of various preschool experts such as Steven Barnett and James Heckman as to how preschool
benefits vary with income. Furthermore, the pattern of how enrollment per household varies with income
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is also reasonable. We would think that the lower income quintiles would have more single individual
households who would not have any four-year-olds.
In addition to providing reasonable patterns of how benefits vary by income quintile, these
procedures also ensure that the distributional effect calculations in Chapter 8 are consistent with the
overall effect calculations in Chapter 4. Both are based on the same assumptions about how preschool
effectiveness tails off in a universal preschool program, compared to a targeted preschool program, as we
include middle- and upper-class children in the program.
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NOTES

1. These calculations require a little interpolation, as the published data only report the income distribution in
$2,500 per year intervals.
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Table 8A.1 Assumptions about How Enrollment in Universal Preschool is Divided among Different
Groups
How group affected by universal
preschool program (% of fouryear-olds)

High risk:
< $33,805
in family income

Medium risk:
$33,805–$56,342
in family income

Low risk:
> $56,342
in family income

Total four-yearolds in risk group

In public now, none otherwise
5(100)a
3(50)
7(25)
15
In public now, lower-cost public
12(50)
8(25)
13(0)
33
otherwise
In public now, private otherwise
1(0)
3(0 )
18(0)
22
Total in public program now
18
14
38
70
Private now
1
2
7
10
Total in preschool now
19
16
45
80
None now
6
4
10
20
Total four-year-olds in risk group
25
20
55
100
a
The number in parentheses in the nine cells in the upper quadrant is the percentage of benefits the group in that cell
gets, compared to the benefits assumed for high-risk group members who otherwise would not be in any preschool.
NOTE: These numbers are taken from Table 7, Bartik (2006). They are based upon Karoly and Bigelow (2005). The

income categories are updated to 2007 prices. The first number in each cell is the percentage of all four-year-olds in
that cell. The columns divide all four-year-olds by their family income. The rows divide all four-year-olds by
whether they are enrolled in the universal preschool program, and by what type of preschool, if any, they would
have been enrolled in if the universal preschool program did not exist. For example, for the high-risk group, the
bottom row shows that this group constitutes 25% of all four-year-olds. The top row for the high-risk group shows
that 5% of all four-year-olds are high-risk group members who enroll in the universal preschool program, but would
otherwise have not been enrolled in preschool; we can calculate from these numbers that this 5% of all four-yearolds is 20% (= 5% / 25%) of all high-risk four-year-olds.
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Table 8A.2 Allocation of Preschool Impact, Preschool Enrollment, and Households among Three
Different Income Categories, and Implications of This Allocation for Relative Impact per
Participant, Relative Impact per Household, and Relative Enrollment per Household
Income group

Impact (%)
Enrollment (%)
Four-year-old population (%)
Households (%)

< $33,805
67.7
25.7
25.0
34.5

$33,805 to $56,342
21.5
20.0
20.0
20.7

> $56,342
10.8
54.3
55.0
44.8

Total, All Income
Groups
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

Relative impact per participant
1.00
0.41
0.08
0.38
Relative enrollment per household
1.00
1.30
1.63
1.34
Relative impact per household
1.00
0.53
0.12
0.51
NOTE: The first three rows, dividing impact, enrollment, and the four-year-old population among these three income
groups, is derived from Table 8A.1, and in turn is based on Karoly and Bigelow. The impact index is the product of
the sum of the benefit percentages times the four-year-old percentages for each income category, and is reindexed to
total 100%. The household percentages are derived from Current Population Survey information online from the
Annual Social And Economic Supplement for 2008, which reports data for households in 2007. The particular table
used is Table HINC-06. The remaining rows are based on dividing the allocation factors by each other and then
reindexing so that the lowest income group is equal to 1.00. For example, the impact per participant is based on
dividing the allocation percentage for impact by the allocation factor for enrollment, and then dividing this
calculation for each cell by the same calculation for the low income group. I do not calculate the enrollment per
four-year-old, but merely note that while it is close to the same for each income group, there is a very slight
tendency for enrollment per four-year-old to decline with increased income.
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Table 8A.3 Relative Benefits per Participant, Relative Enrollment per Household, and Relative Benefits
per Household, for Five Household Income Quintiles, and Overall, with Lowest Income
Quintile Indexed to 1.00
Income quintile
Middle
Highest
All
households
1
2
3
4
5
Relative benefits per participant
1.00
0.81
0.31
0.08
0.08
0.38
Relative enrollment per household
1.00
1.08
1.38
1.63
1.63
1.34
Relative benefits per household
1.00
0.87
0.43
0.12
0.12
0.51
NOTE: These figures for each income quintile are derived from Table 8A.2. Numbers for enrollment per household
and benefits per household re allocated to each income quintile by assuming that these same figures for enrollment
per household and benefits per household are uniform within each of the three income groups defined in Table 8A.2.
These three income groups are then divided up among the five income quintiles, and the figures for each income
quintile are a weighted average of the income groups that make up that income quintile. For the lowest income
quintile, and the top two income quintiles, these three income quintiles are only made up of one income group each.
The second income quintile is made up of a combination of the lowest and middle income group, with (34.5 −
20)/20 from the lowest income group, and (40 − 34.5)/20 from the middle income group. The third income quintile
is made up of a combination of the middle income group and upper income group. (34.5 + 20.7 − 40)/20 comes from
the middle income group, and (60 − 43.5 − 20.7)/20 comes from the upper income group. Benefits per participant
are then calculated by dividing benefits per household by enrollment per household.
Lowest
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APPENDIX 8B
DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS OF INCOME-BASED FEES UNDER ALTERNATIVE
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT HOW PRESCHOOL BENEFITS VARY WITH INCOME
The chapter text considers the impact of income-based fees under the baseline assumptions about
how preschool benefits vary with income. These baseline assumptions have dollar benefits of preschool
declining with household income. However, middle-class households still get some significant benefits.
Upper-class households get very small benefits, but they are positive.
This appendix considers the impact of income-based fees under two alternative assumptions
about how preschool benefits vary with income. These alternative assumptions are the same as those
considered in the chapter section on the implications of targeting preschool access only on the
disadvantaged. One alternative is that preschool benefits are equal in dollar terms for all income groups.
A second alternative is that only the disadvantaged benefit from preschool. By “disadvantaged,” I mean
the families in the bottom 35 percent of the household income distribution that Karoly and Bigelow
classify as “high-risk.”
I first do simulations using the same responsiveness of preschool demand to fees that was
assumed in the chapter text (Table 8B.1). This demand responsiveness led to a 25 percent reduction in
preschool usage by the households who are charged fees, those in the top 40 percent of the income
distribution.
As one would expect, income-based fees reduce overall net benefits if preschool has equal dollar
benefits for all income groups (from 1.370 percent of income overall to 1.192 percent overall, row 11 vs.
row 7). Under this distributional assumption, it is inefficient to reduce preschool usage by the richest 40
percent of households. However, the cutback in overall benefits is not as severe as strictly targeting
preschool on the disadvantaged. As shown in the chapter, strictly targeting preschool on the
disadvantaged reduced overall benefits to 0.397 percent of income (Table 8.6, row 7). The fee structure
preserves middle class benefits and more modestly reduces upper-class benefits.
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As one would also expect, income-based fees increase overall net benefits if preschool only
benefits the disadvantaged (from 0.203 percent of income to 0.218 percent of income, for 22 vs. row 18).
Under this distributional assumption, cutting back modestly on upper-class usage of preschool reduces
overall costs more than benefits. The gain in overall preschool benefits is not as great as from strictly
targeting preschool on the disadvantaged. Strictly targeting preschool on the disadvantaged increases
overall benefits to 0.397 percent of income. Under these distributional assumptions, a strict targeting
policy is perfectly matched to the assumed distributional effects.
I also considered alternative possible responses of demand to fees (Table 8B.2). It could be
argued that the distribution of benefits might affect the responsiveness of upper-class demand to fees. If
upper-class children benefit greatly from preschool, demand should not respond much to modest fees. If
upper-class children have no benefits from preschool, demand should respond by a large amount to even
modest fees.
The defect in this argument is that it assumes that upper-class families have better knowledge
about preschool’s impact on their children’s future than preschool researchers. If we don’t know for
certain the magnitude of preschool’s benefits for upper-class children, how do families know? What
experiences and data might they have that would give them this superior knowledge? Families might have
superior knowledge of whether their child likes preschool, or how valuable such child care is to the
family’s earnings capacity. But in this case the issue is the impact on the child’s future, which is as of yet
unobserved.
However, perhaps over time families may gradually learn about preschool benefits from the
experiences of their friends, relatives, and neighbors. Therefore, different responsiveness of preschool
demand to the fee structure may evolve in the long run in a universal preschool program.
In these simulations with different demand responsiveness, I assume in the case of equal
distributional benefits for all households that the demand response is half as great as was assumed
originally. Preschool usage among the upper 40 percent is reduced by 13 percent, compared to 25 percent
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under the original demand response assumptions. Overall preschool usage and hence costs decline by 6
percent. Fee revenue is 19 percent of total preschool costs.
If only disadvantaged children benefit from preschool, I assume that the demand response is 50
percent greater than was assumed originally. Preschool usage among the upper 40 percent is reduced by
38 percent, compared to 25 percent originally. Overall preschool usage and costs decline by 19 percent.
Fee revenue is 22 percent of total preschool costs.
This assumption that the demand response adapts to the distribution of preschool benefits makes
an income-based fee system look better. The fee structure in this case allows preschool usage to better
adapt to the distributional pattern of preschool benefits.
If all children equally benefit from preschool, and with this adaptive demand responses, a fee
structure doesn’t reduce overall net benefits as much as with a less adaptive demand response. Overall net
benefits are reduced from 1.370 percent to 1.276 percent (Table 8B.2, row 11 vs. row 7). With the
original demand response, they were reduced to 1.192 percent (row 7, Table 8B.1).
If only disadvantaged children benefit from preschool, and with the adaptive demand response, a
fee structure increases overall net benefits by more than with a less adaptive demand response. Overall
net benefits increase from 0.203 percent to 0.232 percent (Table 8B.2, row 22 vs. row 18). With the
original demand response, overall net benefits only increased to 0.218 percent (row 18, Table 8B.1).
Overall, however, what is striking is that a fee structure does not dramatically change overall net
benefits. What it does change is who pays for preschool, although only to a moderate extent. Upper-class
payments for preschool go up, while the bottom 60 percent of the population pays less. Within the upper
class, costs of preschool are modestly redistributed from households that don’t use preschool to
households that do use preschool. It is the political implications of this redistribution of preschool
financing that are crucial to evaluating the merits of fees.
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Table 8B.1 Distributional Effects of Universal Preschool with Income-Based Fees, Using Alternative Distributional Assumptions

Quintile % share of total household income

Lowest
1
3.4

2
8.7

PANEL A: Equal Distributional Assumptions
Effects of universal preschool with fees on:
Earnings benefits as % of income
Tax costs as % of income
Net benefits after taxes as % of income
Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs
Tax plus fee costs as % of income
Net benefits after taxes and fees as % of income
Ratio of earnings benefits to tax plus fee costs

7.030
0.205
6.825
34.25
0.205
6.825
34.25

2.964
0.187
2.777
15.83
0.187
2.777
15.83

2.200
0.178
2.022
12.34
0.178
2.022
12.34

1.227
0.169
1.058
7.25
0.259
0.967
4.73

0.577
0.147
0.429
3.91
0.190
0.387
3.04

1.397
0.162
1.234
8.60
0.205
1.192
6.82

Effects of universal preschool that is free on:
Earnings benefits as % of income
Tax costs as % of income
Net benefits after taxes as % of income
Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs

7.046
0.281
6.765
25.08

2.970
0.256
2.713
11.59

2.203
0.244
1.959
9.03

1.643
0.232
1.411
7.09

0.773
0.202
0.571
3.83

1.593
0.222
1.370
7.16

PANEL B: Only Disadvantaged Benefit
Effects of universal preschool with fees on:
Earnings benefits as % of income
Tax costs as % of income
Net benefits after taxes as % of income
Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs
Tax plus fee costs as % of income
Net benefits after taxes and fees as % of income
Ratio of earnings benefits to tax plus fee costs

7.030
0.205
6.825
34.25
0.205
6.825
34.25

2.006
0.187
1.819
10.71
0.187
1.819
10.71

0.023
0.178
-0.155
0.13
0.178
-0.155
0.13

0.013
0.169
-0.156
0.08
0.259
-0.246
0.05

0.005
0.147
-0.142
0.04
0.190
-0.184
0.03

0.423
0.162
0.261
2.60
0.205
0.218
2.07

Row #
1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9
10
11
12

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Fees or free?
Fees

Free

Fees

Income quintile
Middle
3
14.8

4
23.4

Highest
5
49.7

Overall
100

Table 8B.1 (Continued)

Row #

Lowest
1

2

Income quintile
Middle
3

4

Highest
5

Overall

Effects of universal preschool that is free on:
20
Free
Earnings benefits as % of income
7.046
2.011
0.025
0.015
0.007
0.425
21
Tax costs as % of income
0.281
0.256
0.244
0.232
0.202
0.222
22
Net benefits after taxes as % of income
6.765
1.755
-0.219
-0.217
-0.195
0.203
23
Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs
25.08
7.85
0.10
0.06
0.03
1.91
NOTE: This table is divided into two panels. Each panel does the same analysis as Table 8.6, but with different distributional assumptions. Both Panel A and Panel
B assume the same effects on former child participants who are “disadvantaged” (in the lower 35% of household income) as was assumed in Table 8.6. Panel A
assumes that effects per child participant do not diminish at all as we go from disadvantaged children to non-disadvantaged children. Panel B assumes that there
are zero efffects on non-disadvantaged children. However, there are still spending effects in each case on all income quintiles. Both Panel A and Panel B assume
the same reduction in usage due to fees of the top 40% of the income distribution that was assumed by Table 8.6. Within each panel, the format is the same as for
Table 8.6. The first set of rows examine the effects of an universal preschool program with income-based fees. These rows analyze net benefits, and ratio of
benefits to costs, in two ways. One way simply looks at benefits vs. tax costs. The other way includes fees as part of costs. The inclusion of fees is proper from an
overall social benefits analysis. However, the analysis without fees is more relevant for households who do not use universal preschool. The second set of rows
considers the case of universal preschool without any fees. These estimates are taken from Table 8.4, which considers alternative distributional assumptions. The
fees are set and analyzed as described in the appendix text. The reduced usage induced by fees requires that both tax costs and balanced budget multiplier effects
be recalculated for all groups. In addition, the earnings benefits of preschool must be recalculated for all groups. I assume reduced usage of preschool due to fees
is distributed equally across the top two income quintiles. The effects as percentage of income are the present values of the relevant variables as percentages of
the present value of income. The ratios are ratios of the present values of benefits to the present value of costs. Present value calculations use 3% discount rate.

Table 8B.2 Distributional Effects of Universal Preschool with Income-Based Fees, Using Alternative Distributional Assumptions, and with
Varying Demand Responses

Row #

Lowest
1
3.4

Income quintile
Middle
2
3
8.7
14.8

4
23.4

Highest
5
49.7

Overall

1

Quintile % share of total household income

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Fees

PANEL A: Equal Distributional Assumptions
Effects of universal preschool with fees on:
Earnings benefits as % of income
Tax costs as % of income
Net benefits after taxes as % of income
Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs
Tax plus fee costs as % of income
Net benefits after taxes and fees as % of income
Ratio of earnings benefits to tax plus fee costs

6.963
0.223
6.739
31.16
0.223
6.739
31.16

2.945
0.204
2.742
14.45
0.204
2.742
14.45

2.205
0.194
2.011
11.36
0.194
2.011
11.36

1.444
0.184
1.259
7.84
0.274
1.169
5.26

0.679
0.160
0.518
4.23
0.203
0.476
3.35

1.495
0.177
1.318
8.45
0.219
1.276
6.82

9
10
11
12

Free

Effects of universal preschool that is free on:
Earnings benefits as % of income
Tax costs as % of income
Net benefits after taxes as % of income
Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs

7.046
0.281
6.765
25.08

2.970
0.256
2.713
11.59

2.203
0.244
1.959
9.03

1.643
0.232
1.411
7.09

0.773
0.202
0.571
3.83

1.593
0.222
1.370
7.16

PANEL B: Only Disadvantaged Benefit
Effects of universal preschool with fees on:
Earnings benefits as % of income
Tax costs as % of income
Net benefits after taxes as % of income
Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs
Tax plus fee costs as % of income
Net benefits after taxes and fees as % of income

7.069
0.187
6.882
37.79
0.187
6.882

2.010
0.171
1.839
11.78
0.171
1.839

0.010
0.162
-0.152
0.06
0.162
-0.152

0.011
0.154
-0.144
0.07
0.244
-0.234

0.005
0.134
-0.130
0.03
0.177
-0.172

0.422
0.148
0.274
2.85
0.190
0.232

13
14
15
16
17
18

Fees

100

Table 8B.2 (Continued)

Row #
19

Ratio of earnings benefits to tax plus fee costs

Lowest
1
37.79

Income quintile
Middle
2
3
11.78
0.06

4
0.04

Highest
5
0.03

Overall
2.22

Effects of universal preschool that is free on:
Earnings benefits as % of income
7.046
2.011
0.025
0.015
0.007
0.425
Tax costs as % of income
0.281
0.256
0.244
0.232
0.202
0.222
Net benefits after taxes as % of income
6.765
1.755
-0.219
-0.217
-0.195
0.203
Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs
25.08
7.85
0.10
0.06
0.03
1.91
NOTE: This table is developed under the same assumptions as Table 8B.1, with one exception. Specifically, this table assumes demand responses that vary with
the benefits of preschool for upper income quintiles. In this table, if preschool has great benefits for upper income quintiles, then the demand response of upper
income quintiles to fees will be half as large as assumed for Table 8B.1. But if preschool has no benefits for upper income quintiles, demand responses of upper
income quintiles to fees will be 50% greater.
20
21
22
23

Free
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